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Abstract
Two current perspectives within Anglo-American Nietzsche studies are Nietzsche as radical
aristocrat who supports the exploitation of the masses, and Nietzsche as thinker who revives the
ancient understanding of philosophy as a way of life. A Hellenized Nietzschean way of life,
however, shares the liberal concern for the suffering individual that the aristocratic Nietzsche
condemns for contributing to modern decadence. This thesis reconciles the two interpretations by
examining the way Nietzsche’s way of life is the condition of his politics. Before a new
aristocratic order dedicated to the promotion of greatness can arise, there must be philosophers of
the future capable of founding it. A repurposing of Christian asceticism, Nietzsche’s way of life
assists these creatures become what they are by increasing their will through the intensification
of an inner conflict in which a ruling drive struggles to employ the other drives in the service of
its task.
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Introduction
When approaching the study of Nietzsche, one has many readings to choose from. While
Nietzsche wrote of the text disappearing under the interpretation (BGE 38), it is now the reader
who disappears under the interpretations of Nietzsche. On the surface of this great sea, a new
Nietzsche has appeared. It is one whose primary concern is not providing an explanation of the
world, but a way of living in it. It makes its first entry in the works of Michel Foucault and Pierre
Hadot, who suggest that Nietzsche revives the Hellenistic conception of philosophy as an art, or
technê, of living. “Not until Nietzsche, Bergson, and existentialism,” Hadot writes, “does
philosophy consciously return to being a concrete attitude, a way of life and of seeing the world”
1

(108). In reply to those who criticize Greek philosophy for a lack of coherence, Hadot asserts
that rather than the organization of propositions, the aim of the Hellenistic schools is the
transformation of the subject through the combination of a logos and askēsis. Contained in every
doctrine are techniques or “spiritual exercises” that the student employs in the effort to achieve a
certain state of being. To become indifferent to his royal pains, for instance, Marcus Aurelius
adopts the Stoic’s cosmic perspective, and reflects on his life’s insignificance in relation to the
size and age of the universe. “Keep before your eyes the swift onset of oblivion,” he writes, “for
the entire earth is but a point, and the place of our own habitation but a minute corner of it” (4.3).
For Nietzsche, a defining feature of modernity is the absence of such goals that are difficult
enough to last lifetimes, and persuasive enough to unite populations. At first, this nihilism
appears to be the result of the death of God. When, in the form of modern science, Christianity’s
will-to-truth turned on the religion and found God unconvincing, it took from the West a star it
had sailed towards for two thousand years. More fundamentally, however, nihilism is the result
of the will’s very need for a direction. “[T]he basic fact of the human will,” Nietzsche explains,
is that “it needs a goal – and it will rather will nothingness than not will” (GM III 1). Without an
object to strive for, will has the mysterious tendency to fashion for itself the goal of its own
1

From The Hermeneutics of the Subject: “Read again all of nineteenth century philosophy – well, almost all: Hegel
anyway, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the Husserl of the Krisis, and Heidegger as well (…) In all these
philosophies, a certain structure of spirituality tries to link knowledge, the activity of knowing, and the conditions
and effects of this activity, to a transformation in the subject’s being” (Foucault 28).
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destruction. Nihilism begins as a silence to the question “why,” but turns into a slide towards
annihilation. The unbelievability of God did not cause nihilism. God and salvation with its
requirements of denial and death, is the name for the will’s self-destruction, and the largest sign
of a pre-existing lack of purpose.
Rather than despair, Nietzsche recognizes that nihilism provides the opportunity for heroics.
Through the persuasive force of his writing, he works to replace the destruction of the ascetic
ideal with the goal of cultivating great beings. It is an ambition he stays faithful to. In
“Schopenhauer as Educator,” he calls “the procreation of genius” the “goal of all culture” (3). In
Ecce Homo, he describes “the attempt to raise humanity higher” as “the greatest of all tasks”
(“BT” 4). Greatness is defined in terms of “will” as the source of everything good. It is will that
makes one strong, that makes one creative, that makes one happy. In its multiple forms and
effects, it is also will that frustrates the desire to pin every word to a meaning. At its most
contained, will, or the “will to power,” is the tendency to seek out and overcome resistance
expressed by individuals as well as the drives they are composed of. Whether it is the soldier
standing over the enemy, the artist standing back from the easel, or the drive-to-continue
overriding the cry-for-rest, it is the effect of will.
Outlined by Hadot and Foucault, the image of Nietzsche as philosopher of bios is filled in by
Horst Hutter and Michael Ure. In Shaping the Future, Hutter presents Nietzsche’s philosophy as
the renewal of the “Platonic task of being a philosophical legislator of modern souls, culture, and
political society” (1). It is a dual task involving the destruction of a slavish “second nature,” as
well as the creation of a class capable of steering humanity through the waves of nihilism. Before
the affirmation of life can express itself, the accumulation of Christian resentment must be
removed from the fundamentally healthy individual. Once liberated, the free spirit is to read
Nietzsche’s philosophy and live its call for solitude, dance, and agonistic friendship. Hutter
“map[s] out the ascetic practices of a Nietzschean way of life,” and argues that “Nietzsche’s
‘doctrines’ are ‘attempts’ and ‘temptations’ that aim to provoke his free-spirited readers into
changing themselves” (2).
In Nietzsche’s Therapy, Ure presents Nietzsche’s middle period as the moment when Hellenistic
and psychoanalytic therapies meet. He contends that Nietzsche uses philosophy to transform the
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symptoms of an unhealthy narcissism brought on by the loss of God. While reflecting on the loss
of his own metaphysical need, Nietzsche uncovers pity, vengefulness, and the melancholic desire
for death as expressed in the ascetic ideal. Rather than remove these symptoms, Ure argues that
Nietzsche incorporates them into a “mature individualism” that by reducing their pathological
intensity allows for friendship.
Another recent appearance in the secondary literature is Nietzsche as political thinker. After
World War Two, the dominant view was that Nietzsche had nothing to say on the topic of the
organization of society. Commentators like Walter Kaufmann looked past Nietzsche’s advocacy
of aristocracy in order to preserve a tamer, less fascist, image of him. When they were examined,
Nietzsche’s political remarks were found to deviate so far from liberal belief that they were
dismissed as un-political. This is the more recent response of Martha Nussbaum. In her essay “Is
Nietzsche a Political Thinker?” Nussbaum outlines seven criteria of political discourse, and
argues that on six of them, Nietzsche has nothing to offer. “In political thought,” she concludes,
“let us simply forget about Nietzsche, except to argue against his baneful influence” (12). The
experience of reading Nietzsche is often one of agreements that come faster and faster until the
chain of affirmation is broken by a thought that exists too far outside one’s present. Nietzsche’s
belief in the necessity of inequality is such an interruption. “[W]e are by no means ‘liberal’,” he
writes, “‘equal rights’, ‘free society’, ‘no more masters and no servants’ – has no allure for us.
We hold it absolutely undesirable that a realm of justice and concord should be established on
earth” (GS 377).
Despite remaining untimely, the political Nietzsche is used by theorists to rethink the meaning of
freedom and equality in the twenty-first century. William Connolly writes of the way Nietzsche
provides elements for a new “ethico-political sensibility” that challenges liberalism’s implicit
demand for a “true” self. He equates Nietzsche’s call to think “beyond good and evil” with the
radical democrat’s effort to move beyond the need for a stable identity and the practice of
othering it entails. Like cultures that create an enemy to establish their sense of self, the slave
must label the strong “evil” before constituting itself “good” (GM I 10). “To reach ‘beyond’
good and evil,” Connolly writes, “is to nurture a new sense of restraint and a revised orientation
to the very differences through which an individual and a culture achieve self-definition” (132).
In order to use Nietzsche as a stone to spark against, political theorists avoid certain details.
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Connolly, for instance, is careful to write around Nietzsche’s call to “become what one is,” as
well as his belief in “the fundamental law of [one’s] own true self” (UM III 1). Democratic
appropriations of Nietzsche demonstrate the way that the life of an interpretation, like its author,
rests on the will-to-illusion.
While the political and Hellenized Nietzsches are united by youth, they stand glaring at each
other. A Nietzschean way of life expresses a liberal concern for the individual that the
aristocratic Nietzsche does not share. In aristocratic societies, the distance between master and
slave is so great that the individual cannot be seen, let alone analyzed (GS 18). Nietzsche
remains immune to the spell of the Enlightenment. Contra Kant, he maintains individuals have
value only as means. Only as a stone in the foundation of exemplary being can the individual be
proud. “‘[I]ndividuals,’ as peoples and philosophers have understood them so far, are a mistake,”
Nietzsche writes, “individuals are nothing in themselves” (TI “Skirmishes” 33). While liberal
democracies purport to protect the rights of citizens so they may pursue their many goals, the
true role of the state is to ensure that everyone participates in the one goal of greatness. How can
Nietzsche, the philosophers of “great politics,” be concerned with the invisible slave?
In what follows, I aim to remove the hostility between these readings by demonstrating the way
in which Nietzsche’s way of life is the condition of his politics. Before a new aristocratic order
can arise, there must be those with the strength required to found it. Nietzsche’s way of life
contributes to the becoming of such creatures by increasing their will through the intensification
of an inner conflict in which a ruling drive struggles to employ the other drives in the service of
its task. Rather than the bearer of rights, it is directed toward the rare being with the potential to
step out from the herd, and into the process of becoming “philosopher of the future”.
While in Thales the philosopher and scientist are one, in the Enlightenment, science declares its
independence and begins to play master. The reversal is the result of the way philosophy has lost
its ruling instinct, as well as the respect of those it ruled. Today, anyone who lives too far from
society, or enjoys too little sun is called “wise”. The philosopher is reduced to the critic, the
scholar, the scientist. In addition to a desire to know, however, the philosopher is home to
creative and commanding drives. Philosophers are more than scholars who live in a house of
books. At their fullest, they lead populations towards destinations they create: “[T]rue
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philosophers are commander and legislators: they say ‘That is how it should be!’ they are the
ones who first determine the ‘where to’ and ‘what for’ of people” (BGE 211). Nietzsche writes
in the effort to resurrect this early concept of the philosopher-founder that finds its clearest
expression in both Plato and his Republic.
Within Plato, theory is married to practice. He is “the incarnate desire to become the supreme
philosophical lawgiver and founder of states” (HH 261). But, like most marriages, the union fails
and Plato’s just society remains just an idea. In addition to the philosopher-founder, Nietzsche
writes to revive Plato’s political ideal, for only a hierarchal society unified by a common goal
can serve as the soil in which greatness grows. “Every enhancement so far in the type ‘man,’”
Nietzsche writes, “has been the work of an aristocratic society” (BGE 257).
Nietzsche’s revival is not a perfect return. His future society allows for art as a symbol of all that
incites resistance, for it is through conflict that will as the essence of greatness increases.
Although not a friend of philosophical systems, every now and then Nietzsche drops a line on
which assumptions can be built. “Ask yourself,” he writes, “whether a tree which is supposed to
grow to a proud height could do without bad weather and storms: whether misfortune and
external resistance (…) do not belong to the favorable conditions without which any great
growth even of virtue is scarcely possible?” (GS 19). Whether the authority under threat is called
“tradition” or “reason,” gadflies are not to be banished, but resisted. Occurring whenever
opposing forces meet, conflict assumes many forms. It happens when city-state battles city-state,
when playwright competes with playwright, when drive suppresses drive. As well as its
consequence, Nietzsche’s politics is also the continuation of his bios in so far as it functions to
increase a conflict that goes by many names.
Chapter one examines the role of education in maintaining the future aristocracy’s order of rank.
Nietzsche’s goal of greatness sits atop a number of smaller tasks. Today great beings are flowers
in the snow, and before figures in the shape of a Goethe or Napoleon can appear with regularity,
there must be a society devoted to their cultivation. In order for aristocracy to return to the
modern world, there must be philosophers of the future, who in turn require a source from which
they can learn how to become what they are. This is the role of Nietzsche, who at the bottom of
the millennium-long track to greatness, stands as educator.
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After even his friends misinterpret his philosophy, Nietzsche comes to believe his teaching of
greatness, and the inability of modernity to secure it, is only for the free spirited. These readers
do not have their understanding obstructed by the prejudice of such timely beliefs as the
objectivity of morality, and the obvious superiority of democracy. Nietzsche depicts the
experience of having his audience shrink from the many to the few in the prologue of
Zarathustra. Like Nietzsche, Zarathustra comes to public attention as an educator. “I teach you
the Overman” (3), he announces to the nearest town. As a being that overflows with will, the
Overman represents the ideal of greatness. As a being that strives for the increase of will, it is
another expression for becoming what one is. The townspeople, however, do not understand.
Unable to conceive of an existence or skill beyond their current life and abilities, they mistake
the Overman for the human. That is, they mistake the bridge between the animal and the
Overman for the Overman itself. “‘We’ve heard enough of the tightrope walker;’” someone
shouts, “‘now let’s see him also!’” (3).
After hearing the laughter of his class, Zarathustra switches tactics and attempts to teach the
indeterminacy of the human not with an image of how high it may climb, but with a story of how
low it may fall. He describes the era of the “last man” as a time when in the process of achieving
the greatest good for the greatest number, moralists destroy competition, suffering, and
inequality as the necessary conditions of cultural achievement. It is a time when no one desires
because all needs are met, when no one commands because no one needs the hassle. But instead
of recoiling in horror from this vacuum of will, the crowd shouts: “‘Give us this last man, O
Zarathustra (…) Make us into these last men!’” (5). Like his author, Zarathustra wakes up to the
realization that his lessons are for those who possess not only the ability, but also the desire to
learn. “‘No more will I speak to the people,” he tells himself, “‘I will join the creators (…) I will
show them the rainbow and all the steps to the overman’” (9).
Although disillusioned, Zarathustra does not completely turn his back on the town, for not
everyone in the herd lacks will. Zarathustra consoles the tightrope walker who has enough will to
attempt the journey between animal and Overman, but not enough to succeed. After falling, the
ropedancer sees the truth of his nature in the distance between the ground and the ideal he fails to
reach: “‘I am not much more than a beast that has been taught to dance by being dealt blows and
meager morsels’” (6). Nietzsche too shows an interest in those who attempt to leave the herd by
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becoming more than their modest will allows. He does so not because he admires the effort,
2

however, but because it is these failures who become resentful. It is these broken figures who
after picking themselves up, begin to destroy a greatness they could not grasp by collapsing
society’s order to rank.
Those who have “turned out badly” (GS 359) attack the higher-type by freeing the “slaves” and
introducing a “slave morality”. The result is that while the higher-type are robbed of the material
and moral support on which their greatness depends, the lower-type are deprived of existential
significance. The beauty of greatness is that as a world-encompassing goal, it escapes the
demand for justification by turning it back on those who demand it. The life of the individual has
meaning only in so far as it contributes to the production of the exemplary being. “‘The Overman
is the meaning of the earth,’” Zarathustra tells the townspeople, “‘Let your will say: The
Overman shall be the meaning of the earth’” (3). While the education of the philosopher as
instruction in becoming what one is contributes to the establishment of the future aristocracy, the
education of the lower-type as consolation for resentment contributes to its preservation.
Chapter two presents Nietzsche as a jealous writer who in the process of outlining his own way
of life, critiques Epicureanism as an influential mode of being. Whether it is called consumer or
late capitalist, Western society continues to act under the command to “enjoy”. Although
Nietzsche’s ambivalence towards Epicurus is noted in the secondary literature, no study explains
Nietzsche’s objection to pleasure by detailing his understanding of the relationship between pain
and greatness. “[D]espite his ongoing interest in the Hellenistic philosopher,” Morgan Rempel
writes, “Nietzsche’s reflections on Epicurus (…) and Epicurean philosophy as a whole, have
received relatively little scholarly attention” (342). “Nietzsche’s treatment of Epicureanism and
suffering,” Wilson Shearin continues, “deserves fuller treatment” (72). I aim to fill the gap in
Nietzsche scholarship, and argue that Nietzsche attacks the Epicurean goal of pleasure for
encouraging the avoidance of conflict as that which is necessary for the realization of his own
goal of greatness. For Nietzsche, the flaw of modern society is that it continues to teach a slave
morality that when internalized, causes one to avoid struggle. Although the Christian and modern
2

Not everyone can become what one is. As the jester tells the tightrope walker: “‘What are you doing here between
towers? You belong in the tower” (6).
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Epicurean appear distinct, both venerate a state of being experienced as rest. While the Epicurean
calls it pleasure, the Christian calls it God.
Chapter three asks: what way of life does Nietzsche teach? It is a difficult question, for Nietzsche
does not present his life of the philosopher in the same detail as Plato’s education of the
guardian. A Nietzschean way of life must be cobbled together from scattered passages. It is also
an unpopular question. Alexander Nehamas writes that Nietzsche “refus[es] to offer any
descriptions of what an ideal person or an ideal life would be like” (8). Frank Cameron claims
that “[t]he promotion of human excellence is not a matter of providing formulas or principles
describing what one ‘ought’ to do” (190). Nietzsche himself writes against those who would turn
to him for advice on how to walk though the world. “Now I bid you lose me and find
yourselves;” Zarathustra tells his disciples, “and only when you have all denied me will I return
to you” (Z:1 “On the Bestowing Virtue” 3). Like every multiplicity, however, Nietzsche is not
always consistent. While at times it is his will-to-destroy that philosophizes, at other times it is
his will-to-found. After one year at Basel, Nietzsche writes to Erwin Rhode: “So one day we
shall cast off this yoke – for me that is certain. And then we shall create a new Greek academy”
(qtd. in Middleton 74). In Ecce Homo, he later predicts: “Someday institutions will be needed in
which men live and teach as I conceive of living and teaching” (“Books” 1).
Expanding on Nietzsche’s remarks regarding the utilitarian value of Christian asceticism (BGE
61, WTP 915), I argue that Nietzsche envisions philosophers of the future leading an ascetic way
of life involving the denial of the drives by the drives. For Nietzsche, asceticism is an education
of the will. It is the means by which philosophers grow the will to the point at which it is capable
of founding an aristocratic order in a democratic time. Such a life requires sensitivity to one’s
self as a collection of drives, as well as hardness towards those whose gratification only distracts
from the task. While Epicureans avoid conflict, ascetics seek it by placing themselves in
situations where a ruling drive must refuse the demands of a sea of instincts each wanting to play
master. There is nothing masochistic about this way of life, for as Nietzsche emphasizes, on the
other side of resistance one finds the pleasure of power.
In writing of the way Nietzsche repurposes Christian asceticism to train the philosopher, I follow
the lead of Horst Hutter. In Shaping the Future, Hutter argues that through the adoption of a

9

Nietzschean way of life, “[f]ree spirits are asked to transform themselves into the philosophical
legislators of the future” (3). The virtue of Hutter’s work is that in opposition to the tendency
within Nietzsche studies to label any self-imposed discomfort “ascetic,” Hutter provides a
discussion of six specific techniques that Nietzsche includes in his philosophy. As with most
works on the relation between Nietzsche and asceticism, however, Hutter does not refer to the
lives or texts of actual ascetics. This study departs from Hutter by grounding Nietzsche’s
understanding of asceticism in examples from Early Christianity provided by St Paul,
Athanasius, and St Augustine. Consequently, I view asceticism not as a collection of techniques
that create the self, but as the practice of self-denial that strengthens the will. In so far as
asceticism is a life spent overcoming resistances initially experienced as pain, it is another name
for a life of pleasurable suffering.
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Chapter 1
1

A Healthy Slumber: Nietzsche’s Education for the LowerType

For those who teach at the upper levels, education may involve the transformation of students
towards an ideal. But for those in the middle regions, education is as much about the
management of the majority as the shaping of the brightest. In what follows, I argue that
Nietzsche’s educational theory outlines two types of instruction that correspond to his distinction
between two types: the higher and the lower, the strong and the weak, the master and the slave.
Following Mark E. Jonas, I argue that the role of education for the lower-type is protection
against resentment as the greatest danger to aristocracies. Unlike Jonas, however, I contend that
the content of this education is not “becoming what one is,” but the effort to prevent and console
the very awareness of what one is. The argument is based on a reading of resentment as contempt
for one’s nature turned into destructive hatred for the ideal that reveals it. As an expression for
actualizing one’s self-image in general, and the process of discovering one’s ruling drive in
particular, becoming what one is belongs only to the education of the higher-type.

1.1 The State and Greatness
To understand Nietzsche’s claim that every human enhancement is the result of an aristocratic
society, one must turn to the work of his Basel colleague, Jacob Burckhardt. In The Greeks and
3

Greek Civilization, Burckhardt writes of agon as the defining feature of the Archaic Period. In
addition to the desire to win, agon is the transformative power of conflict, as it is through
competition that the abilities reach their full strength. “The agon was a motive power known to
no other people,” Burckhardt writes of the Greeks, “the general leavening element that, given the
essential condition of freedom, proved capable of working upon the will and the potentialities of
every individual” (162). While at first confined to athletics, agon comes to be a part of every
element of Greek society. In Works and Days, Hesiod writes of how the lower classes compete

3

Spanning from the eighth to the sixth century, the Archaic Period, or what Burckhardt calls the “Agonal Age,”
begins with the establishment of the city-state, and ends with the rise of Athenian imperialism. During this time,
aristocracy replaces tribal relations as the most common from of government (Pomeroy 63).
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with the wealth of their neighbors. In Twilight, Nietzsche writes of how Socrates’s dialectics
fascinates the Athenians as a new form of agon (“Socrates” 8).
Burckhardt’s study reveals that aristocracies reserve the right to human elevation because only
they allow for the expression of agon. Societies dedicated to absolute equality must exclude its
public manifestation, for the victory of one member over another uncovers the very inequality
they try to remove. Even when competition is permitted, agon cannot exist in egalitarian
societies since true combat only occurs between members of a class defined not only by wealth,
but “blood”. Although competitors in a democracy are made equal in rights, they remain unequal
in nature. Secondly, only an aristocratic class can devote itself to agon. One must be free from
work to live a life spent preparing for, participating in, and recovering from contest. During the
Archaic Period, the ruling class despises labour as that which prevents them from approximating
the victories depicted in the epics of Homer. Their transformation into the heroes of the past
relies on the existence of a lower class whose members inherit the curse of practical activity.
Displaying the influence of Burckhardt, Nietzsche’s 1872 Prefaces to Unwritten Works further
elucidates the relationship between aristocracy and greatness. In “The Greek State,” Nietzsche
clarifies the connection by explaining that only a society in which the majority is forced to work
beyond the satisfaction of its needs can give rise to culture. It is surplus labour that provides
artists with the leisure necessary to create both themselves and their work. “[W]e must accept
this cruel-sounding truth,” Nietzsche writes, “that slavery belongs to the essence of culture” (40).
Acting under the influence of a Nature that wants to see itself reflected in the work of genius, the
role of the state is to maintain the division between artist and slave. By “slave,” Nietzsche does
not mean those with iron around their necks. Rather, he writes from an aristocratic perspective
that sees all activity related to securing the necessities of life as oppressive: “[H]e who does not
have two-thirds of his day to himself is a slave” (HH 283).
Said another way, the connection between aristocracy and greatness is that only societies divided
into means and ends allow for becoming. Denoting not just change, becoming is the process in
which an entity uses or consumes a part of itself in order to be something else. For Nietzsche,
culture is an act of becoming, for it involves the development of an elite through the “shameful”
but “necessary” sacrifice of a lower class. “[W]e may compare this grand culture with a blood-
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stained victor,” Nietzsche writes of Greek society, “who in his triumphal procession drags along
the defeated chained to his chariot” (“The Greek State” 41). While at first a hostile force, the
defeated are incorporated into the polis as slaves, and then put to work to further its goals.
A second link in the chain between aristocracy and greatness is provided by conflict. In
“Homer’s Contest,” Nietzsche reveals that behind the accomplishments of ancient Greece stands
the goddess Eris. After filling populations with the joy of destruction, it is Eris who leads them
on to the savagery of war. Her contribution to greatness is seen in the way war organizes masses
into military castes that give rise to the military genius. Her cruelty is seen in Homer’s image of
Achilles dragging Hector’s body behind his chariot. In addition to the Eris of destruction,
Nietzsche notes that Hesiod writes of a “good” Eris who fosters an envy that leads not to war,
but contest. This Eris contributes to the enhancement of every individual, for as described in the
work of Burckhardt, it is through agon that the abilities reach their potential. Rather than an
embarrassing sin, the Greeks experience envy as a benevolent spur that motivates one to ascend
to another’s height. “[T]his strife is a good one for mortals,” Hesiod writes, “It is she who stirs
an unhandy man, even him, to start working” (89). Even the art of ancient philosophy may owe
its life to envy. Nietzsche suggests that Plato wrote the dialogues to show the Sophists that he too
could use rhetoric.
Said another way, the connection between aristocracy and greatness is that only a warrior caste
allows for the expression of the drives that lead to conflict. More than their civilized
counterparts, it is envy, hatred, vengeance, and suffering that urge the individual on to contest.
While in democratic societies such instincts are called “evil,” in aristocracies they are
encouraged by a morality that calls them holy, virtuous, good. “Hellenic popular pedagogy
demands that every talent must develop through struggle:” Nietzsche writes, “whereas modern
educators fear nothing more than the unchaining of so-called ambition. Here one fears
selfishness as the ‘evil in itself’” (“Homer’s Contest” 56). The evil values are able to find a home
in aristocratic societies because they are the values of the ruling class. As a “predatory people
who still possessed an unbroken strength of will and lust for power” (BGE 257), the Greek
aristocracies develop a morality that justifies their cruelty. When separated from an origin in
God, values are revealed to legitimize the actions and preserve the strength of those who create
them.
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Nietzsche’s affection for aristocracies of the past comes from the way they show the conditions
in which greatness appears. His hope for an aristocracy of the future, however, comes from the
fact that only a group with absolute power has the ability to saturate society with the values that
give rise to the exceptional individual. Only nobility can “experiment” (A 57) in the sense of
introducing a table of values to observe what type results. As the head of this future society, the
philosopher is to decide upon, impose, and control morality. He is to “express hostility towards
those influences, habits, laws [and] institutions in which he fails to recognize his goal” (UM III
6). For Nietzsche, the primary role of politics is not to distribute resources, but pros and cons. It
is not to steer away from war, but towards it. The role of politics, of “great politics,” is the
intensification of conflict as the enigmatic spring of greatness through the regulation of value.
Nietzsche’s idea of great politics has three defining features, beginning with the buildup of will
on a global scale. While in section 208 of Beyond, Nietzsche points to Russia as the storehouse
of will, in the preface he explains that all of Europe holds an energy waiting to be released. The
West’s two thousand year struggle to rid itself of Christianity “has created a magnificent tension
of spirit in Europe, the likes of which the earth has never known”. The second feature is a goal
large enough to hold this collective will. While the Enlightenment’s ideals of freedom and
equality look like such an aim, on closer inspection they turn out to be another form of the will’s
self-destruction: “Refraining mutually from injury, violence, and exploitation […] as soon as this
principle is extended, and possibly even accepted as the fundamental principle of society, it
immediately proves to be what it really is – a will to the denial of life” (259). The third feature of
great politics is the expansion of war as that which increases the will to power and consequently
the presence of greatness. In the future “[t]he concept of politics will have merged entirely with a
war of spirits,” Nietzsche writes, “there will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen
on earth. It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics” (EH “Destiny” 1).
By “war of spirits,” Nietzsche does not mean armed conflict as represented by Homer, for war
occurs not just between chariots, but within them as well. In Phaedrus, Plato compares the soul’s
rational element to a charioteer, who on the way to truth struggles to control the horses of
passion and courage. By “war of spirits,” Nietzsche primarily means this conflict between drives.
The repression and utilization of the drives by the drives grows the will as much as war between
states. It is to be encouraged by rulers who understand that it is through the collision of atoms
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that new beings appear. Nietzsche describes the multiplication of inner conflict as “wars the like
of which have never yet been seen on earth” because until him, the understanding for such
struggle has not existed. In the letters of Paul, battles within the self occur between two forces,
one of which the individual does not even feel responsible for. In Nietzsche’s theory of drives,
however, conflict occurs between a sea of instincts too numerous to name, all of which the
individual has the potential to control. In the era of great politics, to be warlike is to pit the
instincts against one another through the eager acceptance of challenge.

1.2 The Greatest Danger
In section 57 of The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche explains that modern society protects against the
questioning of its laws by grounding them in the perfection of God or the truth of reason,
because if the egoistic motivations behind them ever came to light, it would lead to the
redistribution of power. The virtue of aristocratic society is that since its organization derives
from nature, it has no need for such noble lies. “Nature, not Manu,” Nietzsche writes, “separates
from one another the predominantly spiritual type, the predominantly muscular and
temperamental type, and the third type distinguished neither in the one nor the other, the
mediocre type”. The order of rank in aristocratic societies is a reflection of the inherent
difference in will between individuals. This difference is to be accepted and even increased
through the cultivation of those who in their ambition and ability tower above the rest. What
aristocracies must protect against is not the uncovering of their origins, but the resentment of the
lower classes who seek to remove the distance between individuals by bringing everyone down
to the will of the lowest.
At its most basic, resentment is the impotence of the weak turned into a desire for the destruction
of the strong. On the empirical level, it attacks aristocracies by agitating the foundation of
obedient workers on which its free time depends. In the nineteenth century, this threat appears as
socialism, which demands more rights and less alienation for the proletariat. “Whom among
today’s rabble do I hate the most?” Nietzsche asks, “The Socialist rabble (…) who undermine the
worker’s instinct, his pleasure, his feeling of contentment with his little state of being” (A 57).
For Nietzsche, there is a joy that belongs only to the specialist or cog. While the factory worker
might only turn the screw, and the scholar might only turn the page, they do it well, and in
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mastering the task, feel happy. By instilling their own false desire for the development of all
capacities, socialists rob the lower classes of this “privilege of the mediocre”. Further, in
working to create a classless society, socialists remove inequality as one of the necessary
conditions for greatness. For Nietzsche, it is Marx who turns the world upside down, for by
4

giving workers control of production, he would turn slaves into masters.

Although resentment begins as anger, it turns creative and gives birth to value. The most
effective way the weak have of destroying the strong is by replacing the morality on which their
strength depends. “The knightly-aristocratic value judgments presupposed a powerful
physicality,” Nietzsche writes, “a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health, together with
that which serves to preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all
that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity” (GM I 7). But while conflict preserves the will of
aristocracies, it is their values that preserve this conflict. The weak attack the values of the strong
as the source of their greatness by replacing them with their own morality. As represented by the
image of God on the cross, the “slave morality” of the weak is the reversal of the “master
morality” of the strong. It is not the noble drives that lead towards conflict that are “good,” but
the selfless drives that lead away from it. It is not the warlike and happy who are held up as
standards, but as seen in the Sermon on the Mount, “the peacemakers” and those who “mourn”.
Slave morality appears first as Platonism, and later as Christianity, or what Nietzsche calls
“Platonism for the ‘people’” (BGE “Preface” 1). What they have in common is an ideal that
encourages the suppression of the drives used to attain the older goals of master morality. While
in Platonism the ideal is knowledge of the Good, in Christianity it is knowledge of God. The
effect of slave morality on aristocracies is illustrated by Christianity’s effect on the Roman
Empire. “Christianity was the vampire of the imperium Romanum,” Nietzsche writes, “overnight, it obliterated the Romans’ tremendous deed of laying the ground for a great culture”
(A 58). As vampire, Christianity sucked the love for Rome out of every Roman. It replaced
concern for the world with a concern for the afterlife that necessitated the suppression of the
4

The extent to which Nietzsche believes socialism to be a threat to culture is seen in his reaction to reports that
members of the Paris Commune burnt down the Louvre. “The news of the past few days,” Nietzsche writes to a
Basel colleague, “was so terrible that I was in an unbearable mood. What is one’s significance as a scholar in the
face of such earthquakes of culture! […] This is the worst day of my life” (qtd. in Cameron & Dombowsky 35).
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strength needed to repel barbarian attack. The instincts that had been used to achieve the ideal of
the warrior were now seen as ties to the world that held one back from salvation.

1.3 The Role of Education
In Beyond, Nietzsche writes that an aristocracy’s “fundamental belief must always be that society
cannot exist for the sake of society, but only as the substructure and framework for raising an
exceptional type of being” (258). In the secondary literature, there is debate on how Nietzsche
intends this scaffolding to be treated. Elitist interpretations continue Nietzsche’s language, and
5

argue that the masses are to be used, exploited, and sacrificed. In response, Mark E. Jonas
contends that “Nietzsche prefers a spiritual aristocracy in which the aristocratic few do not
dominate and enslave the masses but ensure that they are provided with a robust education that
allows them to flourish culturally and economically” (672). Like other democratic
interpretations, he writes to reduce Nietzsche’s untimeliness. By arguing that Nietzsche intends
the aristocracy to provide for the flourishing of the masses, Jonas has Nietzsche express the
liberal position that the role of government is the protection of a liberty understood as the
unfettered development of the individual. That is to say, he mistakes Nietzsche for someone he is
not (EH “Preface” 1).
For Jonas, the function of education in Nietzsche’s future aristocracy is to protect against
resentment. Synthesizing the educational ideas found throughout Nietzsche’s corpus, he argues
that the masses are to be given an education composed of a professional and cultural element.
The professional education is found in section 57 of Anti-Christ, where Nietzsche outlines his
“ideal society” (687). “A high culture is a pyramid:” Nietzsche writes, “it needs a broad base, its
first presupposition is a strongly and healthily consolidated mediocrity. Crafts, trade, farming,
science, most of art – in a word, employment can only really function on the basis of a mediocrity
5

Elitist interpretations, including this study, maintain that Nietzsche desires the establishment of an aristocratic
order in which a ruling higher-type regard the masses as a means to the cultivation of greatness. However imagined,
this exploitation involves a violation of the liberal belief in freedom, equality, and rights. A recent example is Don
Dombowsky’s Nietzsche’s Machiavellian Politics. In contrast to liberal democratic readings, Dombowsky contends
that Nietzsche’s authoritarian politics cannot be separated from his “Dionysian” philosophy. He argues that
Nietzsche’s radicalization of the aristocratic critique of democracy is inspired by his reading of The Prince.
Machiavelli’s virtù is seen as the precursor to Nietzsche’s “immoralism” in which “evil” acts are committed for the
sake of the strength of the state, and the achievement of greatness.
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of ability and desire”. The cultural component is found in “Schopenhauer as Educator”. “In the
opening pages,” Jonas writes, “[Nietzsche] suggests that what creates the herd-like quality of the
masses – the quality that ultimately makes them vulnerable to ressentiment – is not their lack of
talent but their laziness in becoming who they are” (692). In addition to a vocation, the masses
are to be taught a “toughness” that allows them to overcome their laziness and avoid resentment.
Expanded on in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche introduces the idea of becoming what one is in
“Schopenhauer as Educator”. His command to “‘Be your self!’” (1) is a version of the liberal
goal of self-realization that receives its modern expression in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s The
6

Limits of State Action. The goal is based on the Greek ideal of the harmonious individual as
expressed in Pericles’s Funeral Oration. Pericles tells the crowd that in addition to its
government, it is the Athenians themselves who contribute to the glory of Athens. The citizen is
so well rounded that he can enjoy luxury without growing soft, conduct business without
forgetting the polis, and remain “open to the world” (Thucydides 146) despite conquering it. As
with his politics, however, even Nietzsche’s ideal of self-development involves an element of
inequality.
In “Schopenhauer,” Nietzsche reflects on whether his educator would focus on one or all of his
abilities, and concludes that he would overcome this opposition by revealing a ruling idea that
develops them all. “That educating philosopher of whom I dreamed,” Nietzsche writes, “would, I
came to think, not only discover the central force, he would also know how to prevent its acting
destructively on the other forces: his educational task would, it seemed to me, be to mould the
whole man into a living solar and planetary system” (2). Within the higher-type, all the drives are
strong, but one is stronger than the rest. It establishes inner harmony by employing the abilities
of the others to achieve the political and artistic goals that flow from it. Every drive has its own
desire, and to become what one is means to reflect on what one has loved most as the
breadcrumbs that lead back to the home to the self. It is to get beyond the influence of
convention to discover one’s ruling drive.

6

“The true end of Man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, and not
suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a
complete and consistent whole” (12).
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The danger of equal development is the weakness of instinctual anarchy. Nietzsche writes of
entire eras in which no drive possesses the will to establish dominance, and consequently
individuals feel free to be anyone. He describes it as “the Athenian faith that first became
noticeable in the Periclean age (…) where the individual is convinced he can do just about
anything and is up to playing any role” (GS 356). While in his oration Pericles expresses the
virtue of equality, in his death he demonstrates its danger, for as soon Athens lost its ruler, it fell
to Sparta.
The fault of Jonas’s article is that while acknowledging Nietzsche’s distinction between types, it
ignores his insistence that each one has its own laws. The strong and the weak are to have their
own morality (BGE 228), as well as education. “Any higher education is only for the
exceptions:” Nietzsche writes, “you have to be privileged to have the right to such a high
privilege (…) What are the conditions for the decline of German culture? That ‘higher education’
is not a privilege any more ” (TI “Germans” 5). By writing as if the process of becoming what
one is were accessible to all, Jonas participates in the dilation of education Nietzsche writes
7

against. Cultural education is exclusive not just because it is only the higher-type who have the
will for a ruling drive, but because failed educations have dangerous consequences. Contrary to
Jonas’s interpretation, one does not become resentful by never trying to become what one is, but
by trying and failing.

1.4 A Third Type
In his 1872 lecture series, On the Future of Our Educational Institutions, Nietzsche levels two
criticisms against higher education in Germany. First, it is intended for everyone instead of
remaining the domain of the few. Second, it is training for the marketplace rather than a nursery
for the great. “[T]he aim of the public school has (…) considerably departed from the original

7

Even if Nietzsche intended “‘Be your self!’” to be followed by everyone, by the time of Beyond, he has had
enough experience in the classroom to change his mind: “In our very popular, which is to say vulgar age,
‘education’ and ‘culture’ essentially have to be the art of deception – to deceive about lineage, about the inherited
vulgarity in body and soul. An educator who preaches truthfulness above all else these days and constantly calls for
his students to ‘be true! be natural! be what you are!’ – after a while, even a virtuous and trusting ass like this will
learn to reach for that [pitchfork] of Horace, in order to [drive out nature]: and with what success? ‘The vulgar’
[always returns]” (264).
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plan laid down by Wolf, which was the cultivation of the pupil,” Nietzsche says, “The old
estimate of scholarship and scholarly culture (…) seems after a slow and spiritless struggle rather
to have taken the place of the culture-principle” (65). Today, public schools possess a “motely”
spirit, claiming to provide both a classical and scientific education despite the conflict between
these aims. While classical education strengthens all talents, scientific education results in the
over-development of one. To survive in the academic world, scholars devote themselves to a
branch of knowledge while looking past the tree. For Nietzsche, the consequence of scholarship
is an emphasis on knowing at the expense of becoming. Students are taught how well the
Ancients spoke, but not how to speak well themselves. They learn what the Ancient virtues were,
but not how to be virtuous: “[N]ot one real piece of ability, of new capacity, out of years of
effort! Only a knowledge of what men were once capable of knowing!” (D 195). Modern
education teaches students the outline of the Greek ideal, but not how to step into it.
The image Nietzsche brings into the future is not from the Golden Age of the fifth century, but
the older age of the pre-Platonics. While Plato was a “mixed type,” and the Athenians felt they
could be any type, philosophers from Thales to Socrates are “pure types,” having all ability
under the command of a single drive. The pre-Platonics conducted their investigations under the
influence of a drive-to-know, which Nietzsche divides into three types. While the scientist has
the blind desire to know everything, and the intellectual the self-serving desire to know what is
useful, the philosopher has the tasteful desire for the difficult and rare. “A sharp savoring and
selecting,” Nietzsche writes, “makes out the peculiar art of the philosopher” (PTA 43). In order
to determine the essence of the world as that which is most worth knowing, the philosopher’s
ruling idea controls the abilities it finds around it. To arrive at the conclusion “all is water,” for
instance, Thales makes use of the imagination, while suppressing the demand for logic and
proof.
In “The Greek State,” Nietzsche writes that to enjoy the child, the mother must forget the birth.
That is, artists must look past the often-painful experience of creation in order to appreciate their
work. In Science, he writes that to understand the work, one must not give birth at all: “A
perpetually creative person, a ‘mother’ type in the grand sense of the term (…) such a person
would finally produce works that far excel his own judgement, so that he utters insanities about
them and himself” (369). Beyond the pain of the mother who cannot understand the child,
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however, there is the pain of the mother who cannot have the child. It is the anguish of artists
whose ambition outstrips their ability, of the ontologically restless who are unable to become
what they want to be.
Before embarking on a project of self-realization, the individual throws an image into the future,
and hopes that with perseverance and hard work, the ideal will become real. In “Schopenhauer as
Educator,” for instance, Nietzsche keeps before him the image of the Schopenhauerean man who
“takes upon himself the suffering involved in being truthful” (4). It is he who helps modernity
emerge from animality by recovering the pre-Platonic courage to descend into the essence of
things and reveal the metaphysical significance of life. He suffers not only from the truth, but for
the truth as his philosophy departs so far from epistemological skepticism that he earns the
ridicule of his contemporaries. More often than not, however, one’s becoming stops short of the
projected ideal. In his fifth lecture, Nietzsche describes the psychology of a student who is
encouraged to achieve culture despite lacking a “leader” or ruling drive:
He looks into his own breast, analyses his faculties, and finds he is only peering into
hollow and chaotic vacuity. And then he once more falls from the heights of his eagerlydesired self-knowledge into an ironical skepticism. He divests his struggles of their real
importance, and feels himself ready to undertake any class of useful work, however
degrading. He now seeks consolation in hasty and incessant action as to hide himself
from himself. And thus his helplessness and the want of a leader towards culture drive
him from one form of life into another. (133)
Only a few possess a calling to which they must sacrifice everything, and those who fail to
become what they are turn into not free spirits, but free radicals who break down society’s order
of rank.
In “Educational Institutions,” Nietzsche performs a rehearsal of the Genealogy by investigating
the origin of the democratization of higher education. Observing education is something that for
children stops in the afternoon, and for adults as soon as one starts making money, Nietzsche
initially suspects the greed of the marketplace. Education is expanded in the belief that an
increase in knowledge will result in the increase of wealth. Nietzsche next considers the egoism
of the State. By using the school to mold servants, the State is able to perpetuate its existence
while replacing the Church as the dominant force in its citizen’s lives. But regardless if those in a
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suit or uniform make the cry, Nietzsche concludes that the demand for education comes from the
resentment of those who failed it. “Why this education on the masses on such an extended
scale?” he asks, “Because the true German spirit is hated, because the aristocratic nature of true
culture is feared, because the people endeavor in this way to drive single great individuals into
self-exile” (FEI 89). The resentful destroy the genius by letting into educational institutions all
those it was intended to keep out. Education does not so much create great individuals, as
provide them with the space in which to discover their true self. It protects their energy from
work, their contemplation from noise, and, most importantly, the task of their ruling drive. Not
immune to doubt, the higher-type are at risk of abandoning their creation in favor of an outside
world that promises material success. It is these creations that have the potential to immortalize
the people in which they arise. By accepting the masses, education produces not art, but
commodities, not Greeks, but barbarians.
While resentment manifests itself in historical instances of the oppressed attacking their
oppressors, underneath the hostility it is the destruction of an ideal entire populations fail to
achieve. The resentful destroy through creating. After failing to secure land for himself, Hesiod
attacks the aristocracy through poetry that undermines the noble values. “Work is no disgrace;”
he writes, “idleness is the disgrace” (310). After failing to restrain his sensuality, Luther attacks
the monk through his doctrine of justification by faith. “[T]he impossible monk,” Nietzsche
writes, “smashed an ideal he could not attain” (GS 358). After failing to become what they
imagined they were, the masses attack the genius by making education available for all. The
weak destroy ideals not because they hate them, but because they despise their own nature. They
serve as a painful reminder of their limitations. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche writes that
resentment begins when “the priestly mode of valuation [branches] off from the knightlyaristocratic” (I 7). What he does not include, however, is the cause of this rift. The answer is the
aristocracy themselves. In their armor they shone too bright, and as reflections of the impotence
of the weak, had to be destroyed.
Nietzsche points to Paul as the embodiment of resentment. He calls him the “Chandala hatred of
Rome, against ‘the world’, become flesh” (A 58). As Paul’s contribution to the spread and
doctrine of Christianity shows, it is not that the resentful lack will, but that their will is pointed
the wrong way. It is directed away from life and all that increases the will to power. They
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possess an envy, hatred, and vengeance that lead not to conflict, but castration. While written
about as a homogenous group, the “slaves” or “weak” are divided into two categories: those with
enough will to try and be more than they are, but not enough to succeed, and those with so little
will they do not try at all. After two thousand years of struggle, resentment has succeeded in
leveling the will of humanity. Today, everything is much more equal. Its victory can be seen in
the way slave morality has become the dominant morality, as well as by the sight of modern
populations. Lacking vitality, the masses have no desire for challenge. Their horizon goes no
further than a comfortable job followed by a comfortable chair. Because they suffer from what
8

they are, the first group may be called the “sick”. It includes the figures of Luther, Paul, and
Socrates. Because they take on the appearance of tame animals not even aware of what they are,
the second may be called the “herd”. They are represented by the idea of the “last man” who may
not be just an idea.
Nietzsche alludes to this division in “Educational Institutions”. In relation to students who
become disillusioned with themselves, Nietzsche writes: “There you have the picture of this
glorious independence of yours, of that academic freedom, reflected in the highest minds – those
which are truly in need of culture, compared with whom that other crowd of indifferent natures
does not count at all” (FEI 133). An examination of Nietzsche’s educational theory must
consider not only the training of the highest and lowest, but also the sick who find themselves
stuck in the middle.

1.5 The Blessing of Work
Within the aristocracy of the future, the education of the sick has two aims. It is to provide
consolation as well as prevent the spread of resentment. The way the sick infect the herd with
hatred or “nausea” for their nature is demonstrated by the case of Socrates.
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In the Genealogy, Nietzsche writes: The sick are man's greatest danger; not the evil, not the ‘beasts of prey.’ Those
who are failures from the start, downtrodden, crushed - it is they, the weakest, who must undermine life among men,
who call into question and poison most dangerously our trust in life, in man, and in ourselves. Where does one not
encounter that veiled glance which burdens one with a profound sadness, that inward - turned glance of the born
failure which betrays how such a man speaks to himself - that glance which is a sigh! ‘If only I were someone else,’
sighs this glance: ‘but there is no hope of that I am who I am: how could I ever get free of myself? And yet - I am
sick of myself!’ (III 14)
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While in Tragic Age, Socrates is included among the pure types, in Twilight, Nietzsche suspects
him of resentment (“Socrates” 7). As can be seen from his image, Socrates lacks the will to be
noble. Without a commanding drive, his life is a succession of extremes, each emotion
contorting his face a different direction until it solidifies into a grotesque mask. Excluded by an
appearance that reveals his reality, Socrates attacks the nobility by placing reason at the center of
Greek life. The strong are faced with a choice: either learn to argue, or learn to lose. “With
Socrates,” Nietzsche writes, “Greek taste suddenly changed in favor of dialectics: what really
happened here? Above all, a noble taste was defeated; with dialectics, the rabble rises to the top”
(5). The problem with reason-as-ruler is that it is not a drive, but “tool” (BGE 191). While will
determines the end, reason works out the means. In ages that do not respect will, reason dresses
the will up as itself by supporting beliefs arrived at instinctually with reasons. By replacing a
drive for reason, Socrates commits the very un-aristocratic move of exchanging a monarch for its
attendant.
Dialectics, however, is not among Socrates’s charges. In Apology, he is condemned for
“corrupting the young,” that is to say, for undermining the Athenian’s faith in themselves by
encouraging them to know themselves. Socrates robs the Athenians of their Periclean confidence
through examination. By questioning politicians, poets, and craftsman until they contradict, he
shows the rich and poor alike that they are not as wise as they think. He shows them “they think
they are somebody when they are nobody” (Plato 44). Socrates undermines Athenian confidence
a second way by setting himself up as an ideal one cannot help but fall short of. One becomes
what one is not only by thinking back on what one has loved, but by striving forward towards an
image. As image, Socrates is unchanging, being the same in public and private life. After
establishing the tyrant of reason within himself, he is disciplined, persuading not with pathos, but
argument. Courageous, he disregards death in pursuit of the good. Socrates provides such an
example that a Socratic ideal is established independent of his life. As to why he does not cry or
bring his family to trial, Socrates explains: “it does not seem right to me to do these things,
especially at my age and with my reputation. For it is generally believed, whether it be true or
false, that in certain respects Socrates is superior to the majority of men” (38). Socrates becomes
a standard that even Socrates must live up to.
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Before one can feel hatred towards one’s self, one must first know one’s self. While Socrates
claims that the unexamined life is not worth living, for the majority, it is the examined life that is
worthless. Only after one turns the spotlight inward and discovers the absence of a calling does
life takes on the appearance of a mistake. The key to protecting against resentment is preventing
the herd from achieving self-enlightenment at the hands of the sick. Socrates speaks truly when
regarding his sentence, he tells the jury: “You did this in the belief that you would avoid giving
an account of your life” (42). In the aristocracy of the future, the sick who seduce the herd with
9

knowledge must be managed, requiring not just an educator, but a priest.

In Nietzsche’s writing, the philosopher, educator, and priest bleed into one other. In Untimely
Meditations, he writes the philosopher-educator. In the Genealogy, he describes the philosopherpriest, as well as the priest-educator who “trains” (III 18) the sick in methods of consolation. At
first, the priest looks like an enemy of life. His teaching of humility and chastity discourage life
as both the increase of will and the continuation of the species. The figure’s appearance in every
age, however, reveals its necessity for life.
The priest promotes the life of the weak by attaching metaphysical significance to their way of
being. After encountering a people tired of both themselves and their existence, Paul seduces the
Mediterranean back to life by interpreting their tired existence as the bridge to another world (GS
353). But while “savior” (GM III 15) to the weak, the priest’s supreme value for life comes from
10

the way he protects the higher-type, and consequently the future life of humanity.

The priest

safeguards the great not by interpreting their existence, but by controlling the resentment of the
sick. “[I]f one wanted to express the value of the priestly existence in the briefest formula,”
Nietzsche writes, “it would be: the priest alters the direction off ressentiment” (15). While the
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In Beyond, Nietzsche writes: “The philosopher as we understand him (…) this philosopher will make use of
religion for his breeding and education work […] Finally, as for the common people, the great majority, who exist
and are only allowed to exist to serve and to be of general utility, religion gives them an invaluable sense of
contentment with their situation and type” (61).
10

“[T]he higher ought not to degrade itself to the status of an instrument of the lower, the pathos of distance ought to
keep their tasks eternally separate! Their right to exist, the privilege of the full-toned bell over the false and cracked,
is a thousand times greater: they alone are our warranty for the future, they alone are liable for the future of man”
(GM III 14).
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priest makes the strong “weak,” he makes the weak “tame” (15). He renders the sick harmless,
able to live within society without attacking their masters.
The most “interesting” way the priest manages the hatred of the sick is by intervening at the
destructive stage of resentment, and redirecting their anger back towards themselves. With the
concept of sin, the priest reminds his followers that their failure to become more than they are is
the result of their limited nature, and further, that they are ultimately responsible for it: “Man,
suffering from himself in some way or other (…) receives a hint, he receives from his sorcerer,
the ascetic priest, the first hint as to the ‘cause’ of his suffering: he must seek it in himself, in
some guilt, in a piece of the past” (20). As to why Christians are unable to achieve salvation by
following the law, for example, Luther explains that it is not because the law is impossible in
itself, but because they have inherited their parents’ transgression, which makes it impossible for
them. As with all ideals, the law is not only what the weak strive for, but what reveals
themselves to themselves. The commandments, Luther writes, “are intended to teach man to
know himself, that through them he may recognize his inability to do good and may despair of
his own ability” (57). Luther is an example of both the sick and the priest. He is the curious case
of a sickness that educates itself out of its destructive path. While Luther destroys the law as the
monks’ means to salvation, he maintains the law as good works that follow from the good
Christian.
In addition to turning the sick into sinners, the priest also forms them as workers. The priest’s
“innocent” means of managing resentment is the prescription of “mechanical activity” (GM III
18). While guilt redirects the anger of the sick, work redirects their focus. “The alleviation
consists in this,” Nietzsche writes, “that the interest of the sufferer is directed entirely away from
his suffering – that activity, and nothing but activity, enters consciousness” (18). For the sick,
toil has a number of advantages. First, as exhausting activity, work reduces will to the lowest
point. At the level where the individual has energy for only the simplest of pleasures, the will no
longer strives, and consequently, no longer experiences the pain of conflict. Second, as an
activity characterized by constant employment, work does not allow time for melancholy
reflection. To know oneself can be a painful truth, and while Oedipus reacts by destroying a
means to truth, the priest teaches the sick to simply hide the truth behind the busyness of a job.
Third, as a space filled with the “petty pleasures” (18) of doing good, helping, and rewarding,
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work provides small victories that re-inflate will. Alone in their nook, workers feel a regained
potential for greatness. Once more they believe they can make the jump between what they are,
and what they want to be.
Each type of work represents an increase in alienation from the truth of one’s self as limited
nature determined by will. In exhausting work, the sick are aware of the painful truth, but no
longer care. In busy work, the awareness is pushed out of consciousness. In rewarding work, the
painful truth is replaced with pleasurable illusion. In the aristocracy of the future, mechanical
activity performs two essential functions: it provides the surplus labour on which art depends, as
well as an activity in which the sick can forget themselves.

1.6 Conclusion
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche explains that his ability to see through morality to its cause and
motivations is a result of the way he has experienced life from the perspective of both the healthy
and the sick (“Wise” 2). Sickness here refers not to Nietzsche’s physical ailments, but to
decadence in the sense of a condition in which one chooses a life detrimental to one’s will. As
soon as Nietzsche begins to pay attention to the “small things,” not only does he cease to be
decadent, but he ceases to be sick. In addition to sickness as decadence, however, Nietzsche also
writes from the sickness of resentment, from the pain of an artist who struggles to live up to the
ideal of his educator: “If we think of how much Schopenhauer for instance must have heard
during the course of his life, then we might well say to ourselves afterwards: ‘Alas, your deaf
ears, your dull head, your flickering understanding, your shriveled heart, all that I call mine, how
I despise you! Not to be able to fly, only to flutter!” (UM III 5). Nietzsche does not write from
two perspectives, but from two sets of perspectives: from decadence to the “well-turned-out,”
from resentment to the Schopenhauerean image of man. While in Meditations, Nietzsche is the
fig that longs to ripen if only it were not in the shade, in Zarathustra he approaches the sun.
During its creation, he is “‘6000 feet beyond man and time’” (EH “Z” 1).
But while Nietzsche’s ego may soar above the Earth, his philosophy remains within it. Instead of
the world-view of the metaphysician, Nietzsche offers a perspective, his theory of will remaining
at the stage of “proposition” (BGE 36). Failing to create “a picture of life as a whole” (UM III 3),
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Nietzsche’s contempt for his inability to approximate the Schopenhauerean man turns into anger,
and he begins to direct his criticism towards the flute-playing pessimist. The greatest indicator of
Nietzsche’s destructive vengeance is that by the time of Ecce Homo, the image of Schopenhauer
has disappeared: “In the third and fourth Untimely Ones, two images of the hardest self-love,
self-discipline are put up (…) Schopenhauer and Wagner or, in one word, Nietzsche” (“UM” 1).
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche explains that in order to educate the sick, the priest himself must be
sick, for “how else would they understand each other?” (III 15). While for philosophers of the
future, Nietzsche assumes the role of Schopenhauer as educator, in his insight into the
management of resentment, he is very much the ascetic priest.
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Chapter 2
2

The Religion of Comfortableness: Nietzsche’s Critique of
Epicurean Pleasure

Despite teaching that death is nothing to be feared, Epicurus did not want to die. In Lives of
Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius writes that Epicurus’s last words are not about the
11

repayment of his debt, but the remembrance of his work.

By summarizing his technical writing

in the more digestible letters, Epicurus protects himself against the death of being forgotten, and
the success of his defense can be seen in the ethical hedonism of utilitarianism. Like Epicurus,
John Stuart Mill identifies the good with pleasure. “[E]very writer,” he explains, “from Epicurus
to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it, not something to be
contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain” (277).
But while Epicurus is remembered in the work of Mill, in the work of Nietzsche, his extended
life in moral philosophy comes under threat. In what follows, I trace the development of
Nietzsche’s relationship to Epicurus, and show the way his revaluation of values replaces
pleasure with human greatness as the standard for moral evaluation. I contend that Nietzsche’s
objection to Epicureanism is that as a way of life dedicated to the pursuit of pleasure, it works
against the development of the higher-type who need the pain of resistance for the increase of
will.

2.1 The Goal of Pleasure
The goal of Epicureanism is a pleasure composed of aponia and ataraxia. While aponia is the
state of a pain-free body, ataraxia is the state of mental tranquility. The advantage of pleasure is
that in comparison to the goals of the other Hellenistic schools, it is not difficult to understand.
One can imagine students of Zeno wondering to themselves if they are living in harmony yet.
Epicureanism rests on the pillars of psychological hedonism as the belief that human action is
motivated by an aversion to pain, and ethical hedonism as the belief that only pleasure has moral
value. “I do not know how I shall conceive the good,” Epicurus writes, “if I take away the
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“Hermippus relates that he entered a bronze bath of lukewarm water and asked for unmixed wine which he
swallowed, and then, having bidden his friends remember his doctrines, breathed his last” (X 16-18).
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pleasures of taste, if I take away sexual pleasures, if I take away the pleasure of hearing”
(Fragments 10).

12

In his letters, Epicurus provides instruction on how to manage fear and desire as obstacles to
pleasure. The desire to possess can lead to the fear of loss, and the pleasure that follows the
gratification of desire is itself often followed by pain. Epicurean ethics seeks to free its adherents
from such complications through an askesis, or training, of the appetitive element. “We must
consider that of the desires some are natural and others idle,” Epicurus writes, “of the natural
desires, some are necessary while others are natural only” (Letter to Menoeceus 128). Epicureans
reflect on the difference between desires, and work to limit the need for those that are neither
natural nor necessary through the gradual reduction of the frequency of their gratification. Desire
is treated as a force that grows when gratified, but withers when starved.
One attack leveled at Epicurus by both his Roman and Christian readers is that by placing the
sensual needs of the mortal body over the spiritual aspirations of the immortal soul, he
encourages his followers to live the life of animals. Cicero quips: “Epicurus, brought forward out
of his sty, not out of his school” (Against Piso 238). This objection, however, is based on the
idea of pleasure as something positive, as the happiness experienced in action for example.
13

While Epicurus does acknowledge the existence of positive pleasure,

the pleasure he

establishes as the highest good is the negative pleasure of the absence of mental and physical
pain. It is the feeling of satiation after eating, of relaxation after exercise, of reflection after
suffering. Far from encouraging the gratification of every desire, Epicurus teaches his followers
to be selective when deciding what desire to indulge. Desires that come with pain are avoided,
while pains that end in pleasure are endured. Epicureanism is beyond good and evil in the sense
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Before setting up his school in Athens around 306 B.C.E, Epicurus studied the philosophy of Democritus. In On
the Goal of Life, Cicero explains that Democritus “neglected his ancestral estate and left his farm uncultivated
because he was searching for - what else - happiness (…) he calls the chief good ‘contentment’ and often
‘equanimity’, which is to say, a mind freed of fear (qtd. in Waterfield190). As a modified version of Democritus’s
contentment, the Epicurean flight from pain that Nietzsche comes to critique so much derives in part from the prePlatonics he loves so much.
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“Peace of mind and freedom from bodily pain are static pleasures; joy and gladness, however, are regarded as
active emotions, in accordance with their motility” (Fragments 1).
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of belief in opposites, for it acknowledges that a single source can give rise to both suffering and
joy.

2.2 An Initial Romance
In his middle period, Nietzsche’s comments on Epicurus are overwhelmingly positive. While
John Stuart Mill is called “flathead” (WP 30), Epicurus is named “soul-soother of later antiquity”
(WS 7). During this time, Epicurus assists Nietzsche in overcoming the “metaphysical need of
man” (HH 37). Taken from the title of Schopenhauer’s essay “On Man’s Need for
14

Metaphysics,” the metaphysical need refers to the West’s dependence on the division of reality
for the solace of its pain. The most familiar consolation is the Christian teaching that beyond the
experience of the everyday there exists a world where the faithful will live for eternity. Nietzsche
reveals his own metaphysical need in a letter to Carl von Gersdorff. In it, he suggests that the
value of a philosophy depends on its ability to transport readers into the immaterial. Nietzsche
writes the letter after learning of the death of his friend’s son:
This is a time in which you can test for yourself what truth there is in Schopenhauer’s
doctrine. If the fourth book of his chief work (…) does not have the power to raise you up
and lead you through and beyond the outward violent grief (…) to that mood in which
one sees that earthly veil pull away from oneself – then I too want to have nothing more
to do with this philosophy. (qtd. in Middleton 20)
In his published writing, Nietzsche expresses the metaphysical need in Birth of Tragedy. The
work begins with the idea that the ancient Greeks experienced tremendous suffering, and
concludes that to overcome their pain, they invented Gods and theatre. “The Greeks knew and
felt the fears and horrors of existence,” Nietzsche writes, “[I]n order to be able to live at all they
had to interpose the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians between themselves and those horrors”
(BT 3). Nietzsche describes the Greek experience of tragedy using the terms of Schopenhauer’s
philosophy, which divides reality into the illusionary world of appearance, and the true world of
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“[I]t is the knowledge of death, and therewith the consideration of the suffering and misery of life,” Schopenhauer
writes, “that give the strongest impulse to philosophical reflection and metaphysical explanation of the world”
(WWR II 161).
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will. For Schopenhauer, everything in the world of appearance, including humans, is a
manifestation of will as endlessly striving force. Will can be seen in the way gravity pushes
forever downwards, and felt in the way the gratification of one desire leads to the longing of a
new one. Nietzsche argues that during a performance, the Greeks identify not with the suffering
characters on stage who represent appearance, but with the chorus, which in its unification of
many voices into one, symbolizes will. While identified with the chorus, spectators gain
momentary insight into the illusion of their individuality and feel unconcerned about the
problems of existence from the vantage point of will. For Nietzsche, tragedy provides the
audience with “the metaphysical consolation (…) that whatever superficial changes may occur,
life is at bottom indestructibly powerful and joyful (…) remaining the same for ever, regardless
of the changing generation and the path of history” (BT 7). Tragedy assures spectators that after
death they will continue to live on in the form of will as eternal essence of the world.
Although Birth of Tragedy examines how metaphysics is used to successfully overcome
pessimism, in his middle works, Nietzsche starts to question the value of metaphysical
consolation. To begin with, he accuses religion of exaggerating the amount of pain in the world.
“All preachers of morals as well as all theologians share one bad habit,” he writes, “all of them
try to con men into believing that they are in a very bad way and need some ultimate, hard,
radical cure” (GS 326). Life has been represented as miserable for so long that the representation
has become the truth. But like the morality of an action, life’s essential misery has not been
discovered in the world, but created and laid on top of it. Secondly, Nietzsche critiques the
effectiveness of metaphysical consolation. Unlike scientific methods, religious comforts remove
the feeling rather than the source of pain. “When we are assailed by an ill we can dispose of it
either by getting rid of its cause or by changing the effect it produces on our sensibilities,”
Nietzsche writes, “Religion and art (and metaphysical philosophy too) endeavor to bring about a
change of sensibility” (HH 108). Nietzsche calls Christianity’s strategy of masking pain
“intoxication” (GS 370). One intoxicant, represented by the verse, “whom God loveth he
chastiseth,” is the reinterpretation of pain so that it is seen not as the result of bad governance or
poor health, but as a sign of divine favour. Nietzsche’s third critique is that metaphysical
consolations create more pain than they remove. “It has been the means of comfort which have
bestowed upon life that fundamental character of suffering it is now believed to possess” (D 52)
he writes. In order to relieve the uncertainty of not knowing why one suffers, for instance,
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Christianity provides the answer of sin. But as this response leads to guilt and the fear of being
uncomfortably hot for eternity, the result is more pain than the original condition of ignorance.
While critical of religious consolations, Nietzsche acknowledges they are developed in response
to real pain, and that banishing them from society before science is ready to provide alternative
palliates, leads to a crisis in which moderns have no means for alleviating suffering:
How one would like to exchange the false assertions of the priests that there is a God who
desires that we do good (…) for truths that would be as salutary, pacifying and beneficial
as those errors are! Yet such truths do not exist (…) The tragedy, however, lies in the fact
that one cannot believe these dogmas of religion and metaphysics (…) while on the other
hand one has, through the development of humanity, grown so tender, sensitive and
afflicted one has need of means of cure and comfort of the most potent description. (HH
109)
It is here that Epicurus assists Nietzsche in overcoming the metaphysical need by providing him
with two consolations that do not depend on splitting the world in half. They come in the form of
concern for the “closest things” (WS 5), and the technique of “putting on ice” (EH “HH” 1).
Keith Ansell-Pearson argues that “it is primarily from [Epicurus] that [Nietzsche] gets the
inspiration to detach from the first and last things and to devote attention to the closest things”
(101). As the knowledge and practices necessary for well-being in the physical world, the closest
things include sleep, socializing, and contemplation (WS 6). In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche calls the
closest things of nutrition, place, and climate “more important than everything one has taken to
be important so far” (“Clever” 10). While an Epicurean concern for the closest things is not
evident from Ansell-Pearson’s essay, an examination of the teachings of Epicurus reveals a
concern for the individual as purely physical being. On health he writes: “A stable physical
condition and assurance of its continuance furnish the highest and most certain joy” (Fragments
90). On nutrition he explains: “I revel with pleasure in the body, living as I do on bread and
water; I spit on extravagant pleasures” (37). As well as helping him overcome Christianity,
Epicurus shows Nietzsche that one can write about food and still be called a philosopher.
Concern for closest things serves as consolation by protecting against the pain caused by
Christianity’s denial of the body. It is not sin but “being unknowledgeable in the smallest and
most everyday things (…) that transforms the earth for so many into a ‘vale of tears’” (WS 6).
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As to why the closest things are ignored, Nietzsche points to power-hungry priests who direct
human understanding towards speculative topics such as the nature of God. After looking past
what is necessary for their health, the religious seek out the priest for guidance. “We must again
become good neighbors to the closest things,” Nietzsche advises, “and cease from gazing so
contemptuously past them at clouds and monsters of the night” (WS 16). Concern for the closest
things is to become a sign of living in a post-metaphysical reality. When the idea of the real
world is abolished, whether in the form of Christianity’s afterlife or Schopenhauer’s will, it is not
only the apparent world that is destroyed, but the concerns of the real world as well (TI “‘Real
World’”). The sky really does become the limit and individuals have nothing else to care for than
the materiality of the everyday.
The second consolation Nietzsche borrows from Epicurus is the art of “putting on ice.” It is the
provision of multiple hypotheses for phenomena typically thought to have only one. “Epicurus,”
Nietzsche writes:
had that wonderful insight (…) that to quieten the heart it is absolutely not necessary to
have solved the ultimate and outermost theoretical questions […] [W]hen some
hypothesis belonging half to physics and half to morals had cast gloom over someone’s
spirits, he refrained from refuting this hypothesis and admitted it might well be true: but
he added that there was yet another hypothesis to explain the same phenomenon […]
Thus he who wishes to offer consolation (…) should call to mind the two pacifying
formulae of Epicurus (…) Reduced to their simplest form they would perhaps become:
firstly, if that is how things are they do not concern us; secondly, things may be thus but
they may also be otherwise. (WS 7)
For Epicurus, the foot that most frequently kicks up sand in the tranquil mind is the fear of
punishment in the afterlife (Letter to Herodotus 81). The fear is connected to the popular image
of spectating deities who squint down at humankind with their whips held high in expectation.
Epicurus fights the belief by providing alternative explanations for natural phenomena thought to
be proof of supernatural forces. On thunder and lighting he writes: “Thunder may result from the
confinement of wind in the hollows of clouds (…) and the booming sound of fire filled with air
inside of them, or else by the breakup of clouds that have congealed into a form like ice.
Phenomena require us to admit that this event, like them all, occurs in various ways” (Letter to
Pythocles 100). By persuading his followers that thunder can be caused by something other than
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ill-tempered Gods, Epicurus reduces the fear associated with the thought that violent natural
phenomena are expressions of divine displeasure.
Neither Nietzsche nor Epicurus argues against a belief in the effort to disprove it. Instead, they
provide alternative explanations that surround an offending belief and make it less persuasive
through the doubt they cast on its probability. In Human, the work in which “[o]ne error after
another is coolly placed on ice” (EH “HH” 1), Nietzsche applies the Epicurean technique to the
ideal of the “genius”. Nietzsche counters that rather than being born great, geniuses become
great. “Do not talk about giftedness, inborn talents!” he writes, “One can name great men of all
kinds who were very little gifted. They acquired greatness, became ‘geniuses’” (HH 163).
Second, Nietzsche contends that the skills of the genius are no different than those of any other
labourer. Like farmers, they need to know how to toil. Like salesman, they need to know how to
close. Possessing no x-ray vision that allows them to see beyond the veil of appearance, geniuses
develop their skill over time. Third, Nietzsche presents the genius as an idea developed by the
ego to defend itself from deflation. “Because we think well of ourselves, but nonetheless never
suppose ourselves capable of producing a painting like one of Raphael’s,” he explains, “we
convince ourselves that the capacity to do so is quite extraordinary (…) or, if we are still
religiously inclined, a mercy from on high” (HH 162). By seeing the genius as a statistical outlier
or religious miracle, comparison becomes impossible. One avoids ever standing next to the
talented, and having the height one one’s skill revealed in relation to theirs. Finally, Nietzsche
contends that the genius, as well as the work of the genius, is an appearance cultivated by artists
aware of humanity’s prejudice that what becomes is of less value than what has always been.
“The artist knows that his work produces its full effect when it excites (…) a belief that it came
into being with a miraculous suddenness,” he writes, “and so he may assist this illusion and
introduce those elements of rapturous restlessness” (HH 145). Although investments are
encouraged to mature, and wines are left to age, great art is expected to be born stork-like
without any effort. With this belief in mind, artists hide how much time went into the final
product.
In addition to helping him overcome the metaphysical need, Epicurus earns Nietzsche’s
admiration for being an ally in the war against Christianity. As a rival of the Academy, the
Garden opposes Platonism as the germ of Christianity. Joseph Vincenzo argues that for
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Nietzsche, Epicurus represents “a counter movement against the latent, pre-existing form of
Christianity which came into the world for the first time in Hellenistic Greece with the rise of
Platonism” (383). By presenting the Gods as indifferent and death as definitive, Epicurus
removes the threat of Hell as one of Christianity’s methods of control. “Christianity discovered
the idea of punishment in Hell throughout the whole Roman Empire,” Nietzsche writes, “[A]ll
the numerous secret cults has brooded over it with especial satisfaction as on the most promising
egg of their power. Epicurus believed he could confer no greater benefit on his fellows than by
tearing up the roots of this belief” (D 72). Epicureanism and Platonism disagree point for point
on the fundamental questions of philosophy. While Platonism presents empirical reality as the
manifestation of Forms, Epicureanism explains it in terms of atoms in the void. While Platonism
has knowledge arriving through the soul’s rational element, Epicureanism sees it coming through
the senses. Most importantly, while Platonism executes the metaphysical division of reality and
locates ultimate value in the immaterial, Epicureanism places good and bad in the everyday
world of the senses. For Nietzsche, Epicurus represents a life-affirming alternative to the
devaluation of the apparent begun by Platonism, and continued by Christianity.

2.3 A Disguised Epicurean
While Nietzsche’s middle period presents Epicureanism and Christianity as enemies, his work of
the late 1880s reveals them to be in agreement. As ways of life, both Epicureanism and
Christianity are dedicated to attaining a state of being in which all pain is absent. To “human
beings of late cultures,” Nietzsche writes, “[h]appiness appears to them, in agreement with a
tranquilizing (for example, Epicurean or Christian) medicine and way of thought, pre-eminently
as the happiness of resting” (BGE 200). For Epicureans, this happiness is represented by the
pleasure of a healthy body and calm mind, while for Christians it is found in union with God. As
individuals, Christian and Epicurean suffer from a weak will. “[T]here are two kinds of
sufferers,” Nietzsche writes in book five of Science:
first, those who suffer from the over-fullness of life (…) and then those who suffer from
the impoverishment of life and seek rest (…) or intoxication, convulsions, anesthesia, and
madness. All romanticism in art and insight corresponds to the dual needs of the latter
type […] Thus I gradually learned to understand Epicurus, the opposite of a Dionysian
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pessimist; also the ‘Christian’ who is actually only a kind of Epicurean – both are
essentially romantics. (370)
By suffering from “the impoverishment of life,” Epicurean and Christian can be understood to
suffer from a lack of will, for as Nietzsche emphasizes: “life simply is will to power” (BGE 13,
259). This second point of similarity follows from the first, and Nietzsche arrives at it through
the art of the “backward inference” (GS 370). While commentators typically explain the work
using the biographical details of the author, Nietzsche explains the author using the details of the
work. It is from the observation that philosophy after Socrates continually underlines the
importance of moderation, for instance, that he infers the instinctual anarchy of late Greece (D
165). The jump from text to author rests on Nietzsche’s belief that thought comes from and
therefore reflects on will (GM “Preface” 2). While strong wills give rise to philosophies that
advocate ambition and contest, weak wills encourage contentment and withdrawal.
Nietzsche sees Epicurean and Christian as two expressions of the same widespread depression of
will he first glimpses through the figure of Socrates. In contrast to the instinctual anarchy of fifth
century, the pre-Platonics had themselves under control thanks to a healthy will capable of
folding back on itself and placing all drives under the direction of one. They had no need to
escape into the ideal as can be seen from the realism of Thucydides (TI “Ancients” 2). They had
no need for a “counter-tyrant” (TI “Socrates” 9) as represented by the dialectics of Socrates. As
to why the world experienced “a tremendous collapse and disease of the will” (GS 347),
Nietzsche is not exactly clear. In keeping with the influence of German Materialism he mentions
“dietary mistake[s] made by a whole people over a long period of time” (GS 134). In keeping
with the idiosyncrasy of nineteenth-century science, he cites the mixing of races (BGE 200).
Nietzsche’s main criticism of Epicurus is not who he is, however, but how he prevents those who
follow him from becoming what they are. “Hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism,
eudamonianism,” Nietzsche writes, “these are all ways of thinking that measure the value of
things according to pleasure and pain, which is to say according to incidental states and
trivialities […] Well-being as you understand it – that is no goal; it looks to us like an end !”
(BGE 225).
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2.4 The Value of Pain
Nietzsche plays a number of roles in his writing. When critiquing ideals, he is a vandal pushing
over idols in the museum of philosophy. When declaring the death of God, he is a herald who
announces what is coming. But while at times vandal and herald, it is as “dynamite” (EH
“Destiny” 1) that Nietzsche initiates the revaluation of values, which breaks up the moral
landscape by turning evil into good, and good into bad.

15

In the Genealogy, Nietzsche explains

that as a child he was occupied by the question of the origin of morality, but that this question
later turned into the question of its value. “A certain amount of historical and philological
schooling,” he writes, “soon transformed my problem into another one: under what conditions
did man devise these value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves
possess?” (“Preface” 3). This second question leads to a second question of its own: from where
does a morality derive its value? That is to say, from where does morality pick up the label
“good” or “bad”?
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche writes of the way morality is used by the weak to level the strong. In
Daybreak, the work in which his revaluation begins (EH “D” 1), Nietzsche writes of the way
morality should be used to achieve universal goals. “Only if mankind possessed a universally
recognized goal would it be possible to propose ‘thus and thus is the right course of action,’” he
writes, “for the present there exists no such goal” (D 108). For free spirits capable of seeing, the
goal of life in the beyond has been seen through and must be replaced. The ship of humanity
must have a course. For Nietzsche, the thought that populations are allowed to lounge on deck
while humanity floats along is unbearable. “[I]f [one] succeeded in encompassing and feeling
within himself the total consciousness of mankind,” he writes, “he would collapse with a curse
on existence – for mankind has as a whole no goal” (HH 33). Although Nietzsche can think of
morality without a God, he cannot think of life without a task lying far outside the present.
15

It is as dynamite, for instance, that Nietzsche works to reverse the evaluation of “selfish” actions by revealing how
all acts are motivated by egoism and determined by a force other than the autonomous “I”. There is no action that
does not have its cause in one of a hundred drives or environmental cues, and there is no giving that is not at the
same time a taking. Even saints who give their life for their belief take pleasure in the donation through the thought
that the reputation they leave behind will pave the way to Heaven. It is fate and self-interest that lie under moral
action, and through the acceptance of this honest admission, Nietzsche hopes to “restore to men their goodwill
towards actions decried as egoistic and restore to these actions their value” (D 148).
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By the time Nietzsche writes Beyond, the conditions needed for the creation of worldencompassing goals have arrived. First, the death of God has changed the way free spirits
conceive of morality. Morals are no longer thought of as unquestionable truths, but as laws
capable of being created by the individual. Secondly, “philosophers of the future” (BGE 44) as
beings creative enough to fashion goals for all of humanity have begun to come into existence.
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“Genuine philosophers,” Nietzsche writes, “are commanders and legislators: they say, ‘thus it
shall be!’ They first determine the Where To and What For of man” (BGE 211). In contrast to
philosophical labourers who busy themselves with knowing the past, philosophers of the future
climb the rungs of poet, moralist, and free spirit to a height from which they can create the goals
and corresponding values of the future. More sculptor than knower, Nietzsche’s philosopher is to
take humanity from the hands of Christianity, which for two thousand years has been working on
one shape: the herd animal. While Christianity protects and produces the weak, the philosopher
cultivates the strong: beings with such will they have no need to compare themselves with the
misery of others to know that they are happy.
Goals are not unknown today. Refrigerators are covered with lists, best sellers recommend
beginning with the end in mind, and at the start of each school year, children write down their
academic goals never to think of them again. There are goals that take days as well as years, but
outside of the accumulation of wealth, none that last lifetimes. With the ego of a shepherd who
sees himself as responsible for the sheep beyond every hill, Nietzsche takes it upon himself to set
a destination for the world flock and establishes the goal of human greatness. In “Schopenhauer
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While in some passages Nietzsche writes as if philosophers of the future are still in the distance (BGE 203), in
others he acts as if they have already arrived. At the end of “‘Good and Evil,’ ‘Good and Bad’”, Nietzsche calls on
scholars to investigate the relationship between values and goals from the perspectives provided by their corners of
academia. Scholars from philosophy to physiology are to assist the philosopher in determining what values result in
what type of people, in the way Nietzsche the philologist allows Nietzsche the philosopher to grasp how the ancient
values of cruelty and competition gave rise to the ancient Greeks. Through the historical study of culture, Nietzsche
aims to establish what values lead to the greatest number, and what values lead to just the greatest. “All the sciences
have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers,” he writes, “this task understood as the
solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values” (GM I 17). While in Beyond,
Nietzsche writes as a free spirit awaiting the philosopher, in the Genealogy, a philosopher of the future has arrived,
and he looks a lot like Nietzsche.
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as Educator,” he writes of “the procreation of genius – which is the goal of all culture” (3). In
Ecce Homo, he writes of “the greatest of all tasks, the attempt to raise humanity higher (“BT” 4).
Although Nietzsche objects to the metaphysical division of reality into two worlds, he has no
17

trouble dividing humanity into two groups.

It is from this goal of the elevation of humanity that morality picks up the label “good” or “bad”.
If an “evil” such as cruelty contributes to the development of the higher type, it is revalued (BGE
44). If a “good” such as sympathy delays their appearance, it is passed over (GM “Preface” 6). In
Nietzsche on Morality, Brian Leiter writes that “[w]hat unifies Nietzsche’s seemingly disparate
remarks – about altruism, happiness, pity, equality, Kantian respect for persons [and]
utilitarianism - is that he thinks a culture in which such norms prevail as morality will be a
culture which eliminates the conditions for the realization of human excellence” (129). Morality
is to be the soil in which greatness grows, and Nietzsche’s fundamental objection to
Epicureanism is that as a way of life devoted to the avoidance of pain, it hinders the development
of the higher type who need to suffer to come into being. “The discipline of suffering, of great
suffering – do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so
far?” Nietzsche asks (BGE 225). A step towards Epicurean pleasure is a step away from
Nietzschean greatness, and Nietzsche wants every free spirit on his side.
Leiter identifies five features of greatness. The higher type isolate themselves from the herd
(BGE 26), are motivated by a task requiring all their talent (EH “Clever” 9), and possess a health
defined not by the ability to avoid sickness, but by the ability to overcome it. They have selfreverence, and are life-affirming spirits prepared to answer “yes” if a demon ever happens to ask
them if they would like to live it all again. As Nietzsche most often points to Goethe and
Beethoven as examples of the higher type, and because the five features are those needed by
artists living in a society hostile to all that is not profitable, Leiter equates Nietzsche’s highertype with great artists. Using a cracked idol picked up off the floor, he writes: “That Nietzsche’s
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“None of these ponderous herd animals,” he writes, “wants to know or even sense that ‘the general welfare’ is no
ideal, no goal (…) that the demand of one morality for all is detrimental for the higher men; in short, that there is an
order of rank between man and man” (BGE 228).
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paradigmatic higher type is the artistic genius is worth emphasizing. For, ultimately, Nietzsche
admired creative individuals the most” (123).
In order for the relationship between suffering and greatness to be comprehensible, however, two
more features need to be added. First, the higher-type are characterized by a wealth of will. In the
voice of the future philosopher Nietzsche declares: “‘He shall be greatest who can be loneliest,
the most concealed, the most deviant, the human beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues,
he that is overrich in will. Precisely this shall be called greatness’” (BGE 212). Second, the
higher-type are at risk of losing will and falling out of greatness. Rather than a fixed
measurement, the will fluctuates, and as it does the human slides back and forth along the rope
“fastened between beast and Overhuman” (Z “Prologue” 4). While one’s potential amount of
will is set by climate (WS 188) and breeding (BGE 213), one’s actual amount is determined by
action. Morality is of such importance to Nietzsche because through its influence on behaviour it
has the ability to either fill a will to overflowing, or turn a great one dry. In the past, higher types
have failed to become what they are due to a combination of Christianity’s corrupting influence,
and a lack of knowledge regarding what values are conducive to the growth of will. Now that the
relationship between pain and will has been uncovered, suffering is not to be consoled, but
encouraged.
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Bernard Reginster’s interpretation of the will to power further clarifies the relationship between
suffering and greatness. In The Affirmation of Life, Reginster writes that “[t]he will to power, in
the last analysis, is a will to the very activity of overcoming resistance” (127). Reginster joins
Walter Kaufmann in seeing will as a theory of human motivation rather than hypothesis about
the essence of the world. Reginster’s interpretation has the interesting implication that the will to
power is also the will to pain, for as he points out, Nietzsche continues Schopenhauer’s
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For those who find that what does not kill them makes them weaker, the relationship between suffering and
greatness is demonstrated by Nietzsche’s life. While sickness puts an end to most people’s productivity, Nietzsche
needs it to write. It is sickness that frees him from Basel, defamiliarizes his world, and forces him to close the book.
“Sickness detached me slowly,” he writes, “it bestowed on me the necessity of lying still, of leisure, of waiting and
being patient. – But that means, of thinking” (EH “HH” 4). It is also illness that provides Nietzsche with the
motivation to write. All his works have the impression of being produced in the euphoria that comes after pain. They
celebrate the clarity of science in relation to the obscurity of metaphysical, as well as the cheerfulness of the recently
recovered in relation to the dark of the sickroom. With a body too sensitive for coffee, the sense of well being one
feels after a period of prolonged suffering may have been the only stimulant available.
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conception of pain as the feeling that will is hindered. For will to increase, a resistance that is at
the same time a suffering must be overcome. But as Epicureans shun most forms of pain, they
avoid the very struggle necessary for greatness.
While the great both need and seek out challenge, the Epicurean remains behind the walls of the
Garden. “The Epicurean,” Nietzsche writes, “selects the situation, the persons, and even the
events that suit his extremely irritable, intellectual constitution; he gives up all others, which
means almost everything, because they would be too strong and heavy for him to digest” (GS
306). The Epicurean selects internal resistance by starving rather than controlling desire. The
Epicurean selects external resistance by avoiding social life. “The most perfect means of
securing safety from men,” Epicurus writes, “is the assurance that comes from quietude and
withdrawal from the world” (Principal Doctrines 14). The Epicurean even selects the truth.
Unlike Plato’s Academy or Aristotle’s Lyceum, the members of the Garden do not conduct
research (Clay 26). No students are sent out to catalogue nature. No geometry is studied before
entering. Rather than say how the world really is, its physics aims to say just enough so that its
members no longer jump at the sound of thunder. “[W]e must not think that there is any other
aim of knowledge about the heavens,” Epicurus writes, “that peace of mind and unshakeable
confidence” (Letter to Pythocles 85). It is not the will-to-truth that motivates Epicureanism, but
the will-to-relaxation.

2.5 Conclusion
In his biography on Nietzsche, Julian Young suggests that Nietzsche is kind to Epicurus in his
middle period because it is during this time that he uses Epicureanism to console himself. Seeing
Epicureanism as representative of ancient philosophy’s general goal of achieving eudaemonia, or
well-being, through a way of life, Young writes that Nietzsche’s “bodily condition was (…)
precisely the kind of hostile fate Greek philosophy was designed to overcome. It made him a
paradigm case for treatment by Epicurean philosophy” (280). A case can certainly be made for
the idea that Nietzsche sees in Epicurus the secret to his health. With the exception of Science,
Nietzsche writes the works of his middle period during his ten-years at Basel, the most painful
period of his life. Also, it is in The Wanderer and his Shadow, the work during which
Nietzsche’s health is at its lowest (EH “Wise” 1), that Nietzsche’s affection for Epicurus is at its
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highest. It is here that Nietzsche calls Epicurus the “soul-soother of later antiquity” (7) as well as
“one of the greatest of men” (295). After post-war commentary took away his madness,
Nietzsche’s pain remains one of the last romantic features of his life biographers are free to
emphasize. Pain has become a part of the Nietzsche story with authors challenging themselves to
write a description of his health that comes as close as possible to the dramatic without falling
over into the hyperbolic. Although Nietzsche is no longer a mad artist, he is still a very sick one.
One should not, however, exaggerate Nietzsche’s misfortune. As he himself points out: “We
know quite well how to drip sweetnesses onto our bitternesses” (GS 326). In addition to his
ailments, one should remember he became a professor at twenty-four. In addition to his
loneliness, one should remember he spent winters in Italy and summers in Switzerland. Hostile
fate? Nietzsche retired at thirty-four.
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Chapter 3
3

The Will to the Desert: Nietzsche’s Use and Understanding
of Asceticism

In the cosmos of philosophy, the figure of Foucault looms so large that there is a tendency for
Nietzsche studies to be pulled into his reading of asceticism as a collection of self-constituting
techniques, or “practices of the self”.
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Hicks and Rosenberg, for instance, write that Nietzsche

“repeatedly stresses the positive role of ascetic procedures in contrast to the negative (Pauline)
‘idealization of asceticism’. Ascetic procedures, as opposed to the ascetic ideal, are directed to
the end of self-cultivation” (142). Nietzsche, however, never read Foucault. Rather than
Hellenistic askēsis, his understanding of asceticism comes from the two bibles he grew out of:
the New Testament and Schopenhauer’s World as Will. In opposition to those who make the case
that Nietzsche incorporates asceticism into an ethics of self-fashioning, I argue he repurposes
Christian asceticism into a means by which philosophers of the future become what they are
through the increase of will. Those who engage in Nietzsche’s “naturalized asceticism” (WTP
915) cannot be said to be fashioned by it, for they are already great on account of their birth.

3.1 An Ethics of Self-Fashioning
In Contesting Spirit, Tyler Roberts argues that Nietzsche’s primary concern is the question of
how one becomes a tragic artist: “The tragic artist is not a pessimist – it is precisely he who
affirms all that is questionable and terrible in existence, he is Dionysian” (TI “‘Reason’” 6). For
Roberts, Nietzsche’s answer is the creation of a self-cultivating philosophy one uses to transform
into a Dionysian spirit capable of saying “yes” to life. Roberts suggests that by “transfiguring”
(19) ascetic techniques to construct a Dionysian spirit, Nietzsche anticipates modern scholarship
that sees asceticism not as a negative force that kills desire, but as a positive force that constructs
the self. “[S]ome scholars have recently argued that it is a mistake to view all forms of asceticism
as pathological phenomena,” he writes, “Instead, they suggest we think about asceticism as
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In “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” Foucault explains: “I am now interested in how
the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not
something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed,
suggested, imposed on him by his culture, his society, and his social group” (291).
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askēsis, as an empowering means of re-creating mind and body (…) I argue that Nietzsche
himself offers resources for such a rethinking of asceticism” (20).
There are two difficulties with Roberts’s work. First, he assigns a contemporary understanding of
asceticism to Nietzsche, rather than looking to the text for Nietzsche’s own.20 Second, in the
effort to make Nietzsche anticipate Foucault’s productive power, he misrepresents Nietzsche’s
understanding of how asceticism functions. Roberts distinguishes between a dualistic “ascetic
ideal” in which spirit denies nature, and a dialectic “naturalized asceticism,” which he applies to
Nietzsche. In both Christianity’s ascetic ideal and Nietzsche’s naturalized asceticism, however,
there is no synthesis. Asceticism is always dualistic for Nietzsche in the sense that it always
involves one part of the individual tyrannizing over another (HH 137, BGE 158). Rather than
transfigure Christian asceticism, Nietzsche re-orientates it to achieve non-religious goals.
In “The Aesthetic and Ascetic Dimension of an Ethics of Self Fashioning,” Milchman and
Rosenberg follow Roberts in equating Nietzsche’s naturalized asceticism with Foucault’s
practices of the self. Regarding the death of God, they write: “Both Nietzsche and Foucault were
well aware of the dangers to which this cultural crisis exposed humankind, even as they both
responded to it by articulating an ethics and aesthetics of self-fashioning” (44). For the majority,
the absence of God brings nihilism, while for free spirits it elicits a joyful sense of possibility. As
Nietzsche describes: “we philosophers and ‘free spirits’ feel, when we hear the news that ‘the old
god is dead,’ as if a new dawn shone on us (…) At long last the horizon appears free to us again
(…) at long last our ships may venture out again” (GS 343). Milchman and Rosenberg argue that
for Nietzsche, the death of God means the death of the Christian subject, and that his joy comes
specifically from the possibility of creating a new subjectivity. They contend that it is towards
new beings that Nietzsche’s ships set sail: the philosopher of the future, the higher-type, the
Overman.
In their effort to make Nietzsche’s remarks on the self agree with Foucault’s understanding of
asceticism, Milchman and Rosenberg contort the text too far. They write that “for both of these
thinkers, philosophy had to grip the reader/auditor in a direct and personal way. Both the thinker
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Roberts writes: “[W]ith the term asceticism, I indicate a wide range of what Foucault calls ‘practices of the self,’
that is, practices and disciplines of desire by which a person cultivates his or her subjectivity” (82).
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and her audience would undergo a transformation as a result of the experience. So, as Nietzsche
puts it in The Gay Science, ‘the art of transfiguration is philosophy’” (45). In the passage this line
is taken from, however, Nietzsche is not arguing that philosophy can or should transform the
reader. He is suggesting that a philosophy, when viewed as a whole by those who know what to
look for, serves as a record of the changes in the author’s health. That is to say, he offers an
understanding of philosophy as a reflection of the fluctuations in an author’s will to power. The
full passage reads: “A philosopher who has traversed many kinds of health, and keeps traversing
them, has passed through an equal number of philosophies; he simply cannot keep from
transposing his states every time into the most spiritual from and distance: this act of
transfiguration is philosophy” (“Preface” 3). An author’s sickness is known through symptoms
such as the veneration of rest, and the desire to escape the material world. In philosophy, the first
sign takes the form of dogmatism, teleology, and the search for first principles, while the second
is most commonly expressed by metaphysical thinking that draws a line through reality and then
wonders how to cross it. Nietzsche’s own philosophy is an example of the art of transfiguration.
It begins with metaphysics and ends with “war without powder” (EH “HH” 1) as an expression
of continual intellectual conflict. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche takes the reader on a tour of his work
as a history of his transition from sickness to health. He points out that on their left they will see
the influence of Richard Wagner, and on their right his liberation from idealism. Reading
Nietzsche is more accurately thought of as a test. Those without the health required to endure the
change in his thought find themselves in the position of Parmenides: swimming for the bank,
wondering when winter will put a stop to the flux.
Hicks, Milchman, Roberts, and Rosenberg all argue for a Nietzschean ethics of self-fashioning
that maintains individuals are free to not only act, but become whoever they wish. Support for
the interpretation is understandable, as at times Nietzsche encourages his readers to regard their
life as an art project.
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In Science, for example, he writes that he and his free-spirited friends

“want to become those we are – human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give
themselves laws, who create themselves” (355). In doing so, however, they look past the fact that
Nietzsche is not a proponent of free will. He excuses beasts of prey for being unable to be other
21

One of the main proponents is Alexander Nehamas. In Nietzsche: Life as Literature he writes: “The self,
according to Nietzsche, is not a constant, stable entity. On the contrary, it is something one becomes, something, he
would even say, one constructs” (7).
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than they are, and critiques the practice of punishment for its underlying belief that individuals
are in control of their actions.
Brian Leiter resolves the conflict between Nietzsche’s expressions of fatalism and self-creation
with what he calls Nietzsche’s “doctrine of types”. He writes that for Nietzsche, “there are
essential natural facts about persons that significantly circumscribe the range of life trajectories
that persons can realize and that, as a result, make one’s life ‘fated’” (225). Natural facts include
one’s values (BGE 208), one’s readiness for great responsibility (213), and most importantly,
“the expanse of the will” (213). These facts do not determine who individuals will be, but they
do place limits on who they may become. Only those of noble birth, for instance, have the
potential to become philosophers of the future. “[A] right to philosophy,” Nietzsche writes, “one
has only by virtue of one’s origins (…) Many generations must have labored to prepare the
origin of the philosopher; every one of his virtues must have been acquired, nurtured, inherited,
and digested singly” (213). Rather than a collection of techniques used for unfettered becoming,
Nietzsche’s asceticism is the means by which philosophers activate the virtues or “natural facts”
that make them candidates for future rule.

3.2 The Ascetic
Aside from the Genealogy, Nietzsche’s only sustained discussion of asceticism comes in sections
136 to 144 of Human. Here he notes that “those strange phenomena of morality usually called
asceticism […] are still unexplained” (136). The absence of secular interpretations for ascetic
behaviour is the result of morality’s success in defending itself against thought that asks after
origin. Knowing the herd experiences the unexplained as proof of the supernatural, as well as a
call for those who can make it speak, the priestly class does all it can to maintain the ascetic’s
miraculous appearance. Nietzsche begins his dissection of the ascetic with the assumption that
saintly behaviour has not one, but many origins. Like the genius, he lays the ascetic on ice. “Let
us therefore venture first to isolate individual drives in the soul of the saint and ascetic,” he
writes, “and then conclude by thinking of them entwined together”. Here then is Nietzsche’s first
definition of the ascetic: the ascetic as rope of instinct.
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In his dissection, Nietzsche identifies two drives, the first being power. “[C]ertain men feel so
great a need to exercise their strength and lust for power,” he writes, “that in default of other
objects or because their efforts in other directions have always miscarried, they at last hit upon
the idea of tyrannizing over certain parts of their own nature” (HH 137). Power is always
becoming in Nietzsche’s work. In Daybreak, it is the strength to turn thought into action (42). In
the Genealogy, it makes its first appearance as a feeling of wellbeing (I 10). In the case of the
ascetic, power is both an ability and a feeling that applies only to the ascetic’s tyrannizing, or
ruling part. As ability, it is the ruling part’s capacity to force or oppress. As feeling, it is the
satisfaction that accompanies successful control. Perhaps in memory of The Birth of Tragedy,
Nietzsche provides the example of a will-to-truth so strong it makes a thinker express beliefs his
concern-for-reputation would rather keep silent. The ascetic is the paradigmatic example of the
way power is exercised on the self by the self (D 113). While barbarians are full of physical
strength and can therefore impose their will in the most obvious way, ascetics are weak even
before they fast, and must be content with controlling themselves.
The New Testament plays a role in the division of the Christian ascetic. Regarding the ascetic’s
self-rule, Nietzsche writes: “The entire morality of the Sermon on the Mount belongs here: man
takes a real delight in oppressing himself with excessive claims and afterwards idolizing this
tyrannically demanding something in his soul” (HH 137). The implication is that if one looks
close enough, one can see scripture written on the ascetic’s ruling part, for rather than an
ambiguous “something,” it is the composite of internalized religious commands. In writing of the
New Testament as a force that divides the self, Nietzsche continues a line of thought begun in
Will as World. In volume two, Schopenhauer places the origin of Christian asceticism in the New
Testament, and argues that its primary teaching is denial of the self and world. “[T]he ascetic
tendency is certainly unmistakable in genuine and original Christianity,” he writes, “as it was
developed in the writings of the Church Fathers from the kernel of the New Testament” (616).
For Schopenhauer, pessimism and Christianity both express the need for salvation from a world
of misery, and its attainability through the denial of the will (628). The only difference is that
while religion has to deliver the truth in allegory, philosophy, which always gives itself the best
readers, can show it without veil.
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Accompanying the ascetics’ drive for power is their oscillation between torment and peace. The
behaviour is the result of the way the ruling part alternates between success and failure in
subduing the passions. While victory is seen as a sign of grace and experienced as power, defeat
is interpreted as proof of damnation and brings on grief. Augustine, for example, after reflecting
on how long his hope for chastity has lost out to his love for women, turns to his friend Alypius
and asks: “‘What is wrong with us? (…) Uneducated people are rising up and capturing heaven,
and we with our high culture without any heart – see where we roll in the mud of flesh and
blood’” (146). Only after Augustine follows the command to read the Bible, and has his will-toserve restored to dominance, can he turn to Alypius “with a face now at peace” (153). For
Schopenhauer, the ascetic’s oscillation is the result of the will’s alternating success in denying
itself. The denial of the will is never complete, for however low it may be brought, it always
returns. When kept close to death the ascetic is at peace, but when the will grows back, it brings
with it the torment of desire. Where Nietzsche’s account of oscillation differs from
Schopenhauer’s is that he does not see the ascetic as engaged in honest struggle. For Nietzsche,
the ascetic’s ruling part loses on purpose and allows what it has oppressed to rise up again so that
it may continue to experience power through the overcoming of resistance. “[N]ow [the saint]
desires a complete cessation of sensations of a disturbing, tormenting, stimulating kind,” he
writes, “now he seeks conflict and ignites it in himself, because boredom has shown him its
yawning face” (HH 142).
The ascetic’s oscillation begins after a sudden switch from the affirmation to the denial of life.
The most famous case is that of Paul, who leaves for Damascus with hate, and returns with love.
Schopenhauer identifies two roads to denial, the first being knowledge of the world as will.
Saints capable of penetrating the illusion of individuality understand that all humans are
manifestations of will. Recognizing themselves as the source of all suffering, they begin to file
themselves down with the evangelical counsels of chastity, poverty, and humility, or what
Nietzsche calls “[t]he three great slogans of the ascetic ideal” (GM III 8). The more common
road to denial is tragedy, as for the majority it is not knowledge but sorrow that allows them to
see through appearance. Schopenhauer provides the example of prisoners who once on the
scaffold switch from fighting their fate and cursing their enemies, to apologizing for their actions
and welcoming death. This “great and rapid revolutionary change in man’s innermost nature,” he
writes, “has hitherto been entirely neglected by philosophers” (WWR II 631).
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When in the Genealogy, Nietzsche first asks “[w]hat is the meaning of ascetic ideals? […] What
does it mean when an artist leaps over into his opposite?” (III 2), he is responding to
Schopenhauer’s call for explanations of the ascetic’s under-theorized adoption of life-denying
values. Nietzsche uses the example of Wagner, whose work begins with the hope of changing the
world, and ends by expressing the need to escape it. In “Art and Revolution,” Wagner criticizes
Paul for teaching Christians to think of their body as a “loathsome dungeon” (59),
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but then in

Parsifal, approximates Paul through the celebration of chastity. Nietzsche’s answer is that in the
case of artists, the adoption of opposing values means nothing, for they are simply the
mouthpiece of popular ideas. Nietzsche, who himself uses a few borrowed words, is able to see
that when Wagner praises renunciation, it is Schopenhauer who speaks.
The second drive Nietzsche cuts from the saint is concern-for-the-self. “In many respects the
ascetic too seeks to make life easier for himself,” he writes, “and he does so as a rule by
complete subordination to the will of another” (HH 139). By living under an abbot or according
to a book, ascetics free themselves from the discomfort of responsibility. If Saint Antony, for
example, the “founder” of Christian monasticism were ever reprimanded for leaving his sister
destitute, he could always point to the authority of the Gospel. In his Life of Antony, Athanasius
explains how Antony goes into the desert after hearing that Jesus told those who wished to be
perfect to sell their possessions and give the money to the poor (31). Once in the desert, ascetics
continue to make their life easier. They ward off boredom by imagining desires as demons, and
their bodies as battlefields on which the forces of good and evil fight. Athanasius relates how
during one especially restless night, Antony’s desires assume the form of animals that smash
through the walls of his cell.
Visions are the clearest example of the way ascetic behaviour is born of multiple origins, for at
the same time as inner-conflict helps ascetics pass the time, it increases their power over others.
“It is not what the saint is,” Nietzsche writes, “but what he signifies in the eyes of the non-saints
that gives him his world-historical value” (HH 143). On account of their struggles, ascetics are
seen as links to the beyond, making them highly influential figures. After tales of his battles
22

While the ancient Greek was capable of great art because he allowed the expression of every drive, “the
[Medieval] Christian, who impartially cast aside both Nature and himself, could only sacrifice to his God on the
altar of renunciation” (60).
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spread, Antony is forced from his mountain solitude by crowds that come to learn the path to
salvation. “[H]e persuaded many to take up the solitary life,” Athanasius explains, “And so, from
then on, there were monasteries in the mountains and the desert was made a city by monks” (42).
Where Nietzsche’s explanation of the ascetic departs from Schopenhauer’s is in his theory of
drives. For Schopenhauer, asceticism is paradoxical. Denial requires two agents, one of which
oppresses the other, but as will is always one substance, it lacks the opposing force necessary for
self-denial: “How is the denial of the will possible? how is the saint possible? This really seems
to have been the question over which Schopenhauer became a philosopher” (BGE 47).
Nietzsche’s resolves Schopenhauer’s paradox by presenting the will as a multiplicity of drives in
continual conflict. In Daybreak, he writes of the individual as a “totality of drives” (119). In
Beyond, he explains that “every single one of them would like only too well to represent just
itself as the ultimate purpose of existence” (6). When the ascetic engages in self-denial, it is not
the will denying the will, or the soul disciplining the flesh, but one drive saying “no” to and
commanding all the others.
As the conscious denial of the instincts, asceticism does not belong to the religious. It is
practiced by artists who in order to create must prevent the drives from seeking their separate
ends, while simultaneously employing them in the service of creation. “How one becomes what
one is,” is the phrase Nietzsche gives to the process in which one’s strongest drive eventually
comes to power and puts the others to work in the service of its goals. It is this master drive,
what Nietzsche calls the “ruling passion” (UM IV 2), or “organizing idea” (EH “Clever” 9), that
represents the ascetic’s ruling part. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche writes that one becomes what one
is by forgetting what one is. It is while consumed with duty that “the organizing ‘idea’ that is
destined to rule keeps growing deep down – it begins to command (…) one by one, it trains all
subservient capacities before giving any hint of the dominant task, ‘goal,’ ‘aim,’ or ‘meaning’”
(“Clever” 9). Nietzsche’s own task is the revaluation of all values, and the drive to which it
belongs might be called the will-to-restore, for Nietzsche’s “new” (BGE 212) values are more of
a return to older Greek virtues.
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3.3 The Philosopher’s Discipline
In book five of Science, Nietzsche presents his philosophy as a stroll through the remains of
Christianity. “We Europeans confront a world of tremendous ruins,” he writes, “The Church is
this city of decline” (358). Nietzsche points to what has fallen as well as indicates what still
stands. Although entire populations no longer believe in God, for example, the feeling of sin
remains. During his walk, Nietzsche also adds to the destruction: “What defines me, what sets
me apart from the whole rest of humanity is that I uncovered Christian morality […] [It] is an
event without parallel, a real catastrophe” (EH “Destiny” 7-8). Nietzsche uncovers Christianity,
exposing its beliefs to the acid rain of criticism, a number of ways. He reveals the origin of
Christian morality in resentment. He reveals the effect of Christian values on the higher-type. He
reveals the spring of self-interest behind Christian behaviour. It is this last method to which
Nietzsche’s dissection of the ascetic belongs, for by discovering the ego in the saint, he destroys
their obscuring halo.
While no doubt a vandal, Nietzsche is also an odd conservationist. As the Christians picked
through the Ancient world, Nietzsche walks through the Christian one, picking up a stone here
and there for use in his construction of human greatness. In Daybreak, he writes that those who
outgrow religion must be like charioteers who at the end of the track have no choice but to turn
around. Nietzsche’s philosophy is such a maneuver. It is the turning around of Nietzsche, who
returns to the study of Christianity after his adolescent disillusionment, as well as Christianity
itself, which is re-oriented towards life. Nietzsche takes asceticism, Christianity’s “lowest
foundation” (GS 358), and repurposes it to assist the philosophers of the future with their task of
furthering the development of humanity. This development is not measured by the attainment of
a certain condition for all, but by the creation of exemplary individuals whose brilliance will
justify the existence of all those who labour to bring them into being.
In Beyond, Nietzsche writes that the philosophers’ task demands that they “create values” (211).
The etching of tablets, however, is only a part of their responsibility. Divided into three stages,
the philosopher’s task begins with a vision of human greatness that reflects insight into the way
the human is something that becomes. Zarathustra’s Overman is one example. Secondly,
philosophers are to fashion values capable of bringing the ideal into the real. These values will
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be a reversal of the Christian morality that caused greatness to make an early exit from world
history. In the third and longest stage, philosophers are to rule over an aristocratic society
devoted to the realization of their vision. Populations will be sacrificed, and scholars put to work
studying the relationship between value and culture. While today it is science that wants to “lay
down laws for philosophy” (204), science and its labourers are merely “instruments” (207) to be
used by the new philosopher kings. The philosophers’ task requires creativity, knowledge and
hardness towards oneself and others. That is to say, it requires will, and asceticism is to be the
means to increase it. “I also want to make asceticism natural again,” Nietzsche writes, “in place
of the aim of denial, the aim of strengthening; a gymnastics of the will; abstinence and periods of
fasting of all kinds” (WTP 915).
It is not difficult to find incitements to denial in the New Testament. Paul instructs his new
converts to “deal with the world as though they had no dealings with it” (1 Cor 7:31), and
23

clarifies that although celibacy is not necessary for salvation, it is the preferred state (7:8).

The

first time asceticism is incorporated into a Christian way of life, however, is in the work of the
fourth century monk Evagrius Ponticus. Evagrius writes within the theology of Origen, who
under the influence of Alexandrian Platonism understands human souls as originally spiritual
beings that have fallen from unity with God. Evagrius presents the ascetic life as three stages a
monk must pass though in order to overcome this alienation. There is the practical life occupied
with impassibility or the mastery of passion, the contemplative life in which the monk uncovers
the truth in beings, and finally the theological life in which the advanced gain insight into the
nature of God. “Do you want to take up the solitary life for what it is, and to race after the
trophies of stillness?” Evagrius asks, “Leave behind the concerns of the world, the principalities
and powers set over them; that is, stand free of material concerns and the passions, beyond all
desire” (5). In the Praktikos, Evagrius addresses monks engaged in the practical life and offers
advice on how to combat the eight evil thoughts or demons. By stirring up desire, demons
prevent impassibility and make progression to the next stage impossible. For demons that attack
the body, Evagrius recommends fasting. For those such as anger that affect the mind, he counsels
the unceasing vigilance of thought. The writings of Evagrius form the theoretical foundation of
23

For Nietzsche, Paul is responsible for, or at least symbolic of, Christianity’s life denying character. “People like St
Paul have an ‘evil eye’ for the passions,” he writes, “they come to know only what is dirty, disfiguring, and heartbreaking about them; hence their ideal impulse seeks the annihilation of the passions” (GS 139).
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Egyptian, or early Christian, monasticism (Dunn 16). While Evagrius seems far from Nietzsche,
it is to this period that Nietzsche refers when he writes of the philosopher’s admiration for “those
resolute men who one day said No to all servitude and went into some desert” (GM III 7).
Like Christian asceticism, Nietzsche’s naturalized asceticism involves self-denial. “Everyday is
ill employed,” he writes, “in which one has not denied oneself some small thing at least once”
(WS 305). The fundamental difference is that while Christian asceticism is practiced in order to
weaken that which is denied, natural asceticism is practiced in order to strengthen that which
denies. Every time the philosopher’s ruling idea pushes back a drive that makes its way into
consciousness, a resistance is overcome and the will increases (A 2). The philosopher feels
happy, more powerful, and increasingly open to challenge. For Nietzsche, Christian asceticism
involves denial to the point of death. “The church combats the passions by cutting them off in
every sense,” he writes, “its technique, its ‘cure’, is castration” (TI “Morality” 1). The drives,
however, are not to be killed but “spiritualized”, that is to say, used. Not only is their overcoming
necessary for the experience of power, but their abilities are needed for the completion of the
philosopher’s task. While the philosopher’s discipline is harsh, it is fundamentally instinct
friendly, and hence “natural”.
Nietzsche’s asceticism prepares philosophers for future rule by providing them with practice
imposing order on an unruly multiplicity. “Asceticism and puritanism,” he writes, “are almost
indispensible means for educating and ennobling a race that wishes to become master over its
origins among the rabble and that works its way up toward future rule” (BGE 61). Before
philosophers can rule society, they must be able to rule themselves. Their master drive must be
capable of denying the others, while at the same time ensuring their participation in its task. It is
by practicing self-denial until their ruling drives are strong enough to unify their inner lives that
philosophers rise above the “rabble” who suffer from instinctual anarchy, and characterize all
sick culture.
Asceticism is able to train philosophers on account of the structural similarity between individual
and society. Both the noble individual and aristocratic society are composed of a ruling element
that imposes a goal, and a mass of conflicting forces that would like to impose their own. “[O]ur
body is but a social structure composed of many souls” (BGE 19) Nietzsche writes. A parallel is
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established between the ruling drive that makes use of all instincts, and the ruling philosopher
who makes use of all scholars. As the philosopher cannot be distinguished from the ruling idea
that calls itself “I,” the training it receives through asceticism carries over into its political career.
As well as denial, the philosopher’s discipline shares a methodological approach with Christian
asceticism. Philosophers do not become who they are all at once, but rather slowly over the
course of a process involving many stages. In section six of Beyond, Nietzsche sketches a path to
the philosopher that looks not unlike the monk’s path to perfection. He writes:
It may be necessary for the education of a genuine philosopher that he himself has also
once stood on all these steps on which his servants, the scientific laborers of philosophy,
remain standing – have to remain standing. Perhaps he himself must have been critic and
skeptic and dogmatist and historian and also poet and collector and traveler and solver of
riddles and moralist and seer and ‘free spirit’. (211)
On the stairway to the philosopher, every step represents an increase in will, and asceticism is the
means by which the philosopher steps up. When one drive denies another, two swords meet in
battle and although the individual is both winner and loser, the will increases. “[W]hat happens
here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth,” Nietzsche writes,
“namely, the governing class identifies itself with the success of the commonwealth” (BGE 19).
At the bottom of the stairs lays the nihilist who on account of an extreme impoverishment of will
“does not merely say No, but – horrible thought – does No” (BGE 208). After hearing the news
that God is dead, it is the nihilist who reacts by joining the Russian soldier face down in the
snow. Beyond this body sits the skeptic, who on account of a weak will defers all judgment.
Nietzsche prescribes the “lulling poppy of skepticism” (208) to combat the nihilist’s will-tonothingness, for although skeptics are unable to affirm life, they cannot deny it either. The
inability to pass judgment is a result of the way classes have mixed and combined their standards
of evaluation. As hybrids of master and slave moralities, skeptics find themselves stuck between
two equally persuasive arguments, and unable to say either “yes” or “no”. On the third step
stands the critic. While skeptics have so many conflicting methods of evaluation that they never
determine the value of anything, critics have only one and so feel confident expressing the value
of everything.
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Like the monk on the path to perfection, the scholar on the path to the philosopher must be wary
of obstacles. “The dangers for a philosopher’s development are indeed so manifold," Nietzsche
writes, “that one may doubt whether this fruit can still ripen at all” (BGE 205). The greatest
danger is the demon of specialization that impedes progress not by stimulating the drives, but by
keeping them silent. Specialists exercise the abilities their field requires, but greatness is defined
by the use of all talent, and philosophers are to “betray something of [their] own ideal” (BGE
212). Confined to a discipline, scholars cannot grow their will through contact with fresh streams
of thought that must be either worked or thrown out. They cannot change from one who learns
what is already the case, to one who plays a role in the creation of the not yet. What distinguishes
free spirits from the other steps is that as a result of a “great liberation” (HH “Preface” 3), they
are removed from such obstacles. Having flown above all hooks, be it the moralist’s duty or the
scholar’s nook, they have the independence to conflict with the outer world, as well as the time
to order the inner one.
Considering Nietzsche’s view of academics, it is surprising that he titles section six of Beyond,
“We Scholars”. “Scholars who at bottom do little nowadays but thumb books,” he writes,
“ultimately lose their capacity to think for themselves” (EH “Clever” 8). For Nietzsche, thoughts
that arise in the presence of books are mere reactions lacking the possibility of originality. He
views reading as a vacation from one’s own ideas, and approves only of thoughts born standing
up. While writing about Nietzsche, that is to say, when reading about what others have written,
one has the uncomfortable experience of recognizing oneself as the scholar Nietzsche derides.
Nietzsche, however, is not above self-denigration. In fact, it is by making fun of himself that he
increases his opinion of himself. The artist “arrives at the ultimate pinnacle of his greatness only
when he comes to see himself and his art beneath him - when he knows how to laugh at himself”
(EH “Books” 3). Nietzsche includes himself in the title for he too was a scholar, and the path he
sets for the philosopher is modeled on the one he followed. Like the philosopher, Nietzsche
24

occupied many identities before becoming what he is.

“I was many things and in many places

in order to be able to become one thing,” he writes, “I had to be a scholar, too, for some time”
(EH “UM” 3). Like the philosopher, Nietzsche’s thought is characterized by increasing
24

In Twilight he writes: “Those were steps for me, and I climbed them, - to do it, I had to get over them. But they
thought that I wanted to come to rest on them …” (“Maxims” 42).
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affirmation. While Tragedy is written in the shadow of pessimism, Ecce Homo ends by
expressing allegiance to Dionysus as symbol for the happy acceptance of all that life contains.
Nietzsche is concerned about the direction of the will as much as its strength, and at the top of
the philosopher’s staircase one finds not only the greatest will, but also the loudest “yes”.
A final similarity. As with Christian asceticism, the philosopher’s discipline is connected to an
idea of transcendence. While for the Christian, denial is the means by which the soul goes
beyond the material world,

25

for the philosopher, asceticism is the means by which the thinker

goes beyond the influence of the present. As those who question the unquestionable,
philosophers need protection from their age. In “the era of the ‘morality of mores’” (GM III 9)
when reason was immoral and change the greatest danger, the first contemplatives wore the
armor of ascetic madness. It is only by starving themselves into the sand that they could ward off
the hostility of the strong. Today, philosophers are still untimely, only it is not their lives that are
in danger, but their future as philosophers. Professional comfort offers many chairs and the
spread of equality makes greatness taboo. In order to become who they are, philosophers need a
space beyond modernity, and asceticism provides a path to such a desert. While for the priest,
asceticism “counts as a bridge to that other mode of existence” (11), for the philosopher,
“[a]scetic ideals reveal so many bridges to independence” (7). By protecting philosophers against
distractions that pull them from thought, chastity, poverty, and humility represent the conditions
of their cultivation.

3.4 Conclusion
The philosopher’s discipline involves more than the individual going beyond the present. As that
which equips philosophers to carry out their task of ushering in a new greatness, it participates in
humanity going beyond itself. When realized, the philosophers’ vision is to be something more
than the all too human. If humanity’s lucky strikes have been springs, then these new beings will
be fountains that like Antony bring life to the desert.

25

Evagrius describes the contemplative mind as “possess[ing] little or no awareness at all of the irrational part of the
soul, for knowledge has carried it off to the heights, and separated it from sensible things” (66).
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Throughout his writing, Nietzsche worries that humanity is falling back into being. “‘All beings
have so far created something beyond themselves,’” Zarathustra tells his audience, “‘and you
want to be the ebb of this great tide and even go back to the beasts rather than overcome the
human?’” (Z “Preface” 3). The significance of the Overman is that as a goal humanity can aspire
to in the wake of God, it has the potential to prevent another fall. Unlike salvation, however, the
philosophers’ vision represents transcendence not between worlds, but within the world. A
recovering metaphysician, the only division Nietzsche allows himself is an ontological-temporal
distinction between what the human is now, and what it will be in the future. During his climb
among the ruins of Christianity, Nietzsche tips the great chain of being on its side and replaces
reason with will. On this horizontal model of being, the human is no longer a hybrid of angel and
animal, but creator and creature (BGE 225). Not just the ascetic, every individual is a divided
self, composed of drives under a ruler that in its pride calls the other drives “animal”. The
greatest threat to the philosopher’s vision is the appearance of the “last man”. As those without
the will required for one drive to assume dominance for any length of time, they lack the
possibility of self-denial as the internal mechanism by which the will is increased, and the human
surpassed. “‘[O]ne must still have chaos within,” Zarathustra explains, “in order to give birth to a
dancing star’” (Z “Preface” 5). Not a stairway to heaven, Nietzsche’s asceticism is a strand in the
rope tied between the human and what comes next.
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Conclusion
In the face of Nietzsche’s writing, it can seem as if there is only one question to ask: what does it
mean? Nietzsche is a Delphic thinker who attracts many priests. Walter Kaufmann, for example,
writes that “Nietzsche’s way of writing (…) make[s] it difficult for the contemporary reader to
find out what Nietzsche himself stood for,” and so, “[t]he present book aims at a comprehensive
reconstruction of Nietzsche’s thought” (xiii). In writing of “Nietzsche,” commentators imply his
work contains a single meaning, and that through the act of interpretation, this meaning can be
recovered. In addition to God, however, the author has also died. Today, the meaning of a work
is not determined by the intention of an author, but created through the interaction of reader and
text. Rather than a vessel of authoritative reading, the work is regarded as a collection of signs
that make possible a number of interpretations. Today, one writes not of “Nietzsche,” but
“Nietzsches”.
In the absence of an author to be discovered, the role of commentary changes. Instead of writing
to explain what a work means, commentators write to show how it can be applied. They ask how
a text can be used to solve new problems, or think differently about familiar topics. As seen in
the work of William Connolly, these questions are posed to Nietzsche as political thinker.
Nietzsche, however, collapses the difference between these approaches. For Nietzsche, the
arrival of the philosopher-founder is not a hope, but a necessary event his philosophy helps to
bring into being. Regarding the free spirit as the last stage in the philosopher’s metamorphosis,
he writes: “perhaps I shall do something to speed their coming if I describe in advance under
what vicissitudes, upon what paths, I see them coming?” (HH “Preface” 2). Nietzsche’s writing
describes the coming age, at the same time as it participates in its creation, by providing a source
of conflict in a current age dedicated to peace. In the effort to determining what Nietzsche
means, his free spirited readers struggle against the text, and in struggling, use it to increase their
will.
When reading Nietzsche, one contends with incomplete thought. “To understand the most
abbreviated language ever spoken by a philosopher,” he writes in a draft of Ecce Homo, “one
must follow the opposite procedure of that generally required by philosophical literature.
Usually, one must condense, or upset one’s digestion; I have to be diluted” (“Appendix” 2).
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While most philosophers use too many words, and have their readers wondering how many
pages until the end, Nietzsche includes too few.
Nietzsche begins his inquiry into philosophy through the writing of Diogenes Laertius, and in a
sense, he never leaves.

26

Like Diogenes, Nietzsche writes about philosophers without being a

philosopher in the way his subjects are. He is too interested in personality. He is too interesting,
period. With no formal training in philosophy, Nietzsche strays from the norms of the tradition.
Instead of taking small steps from proposition to proposition, he follows the pre-Platonics in
making imaginative leaps. Instead of deducing from first principles, he infers an author’s health
from the author’s work. In its lack of conventional method, Nietzsche’s writing is something less
than philosophy, while in its ability to hold the reader’s attention, something more.
There are a few explanations as to why Nietzsche does not always include the reasons that lead
to his belief. First, they are dishonest, giving the appearance of rationality to what is irrational in
origin. Nietzsche follows Hume in maintaining that belief is the sudden product of will rather
than a destination one arrives at by following a line of pros and cons (D 358). Second, reasons
are a sign of sickness. Dialectics indicate that rationality has been used to establish an internal
order that the drives are too weak to impose themselves. The decadence of the fifth century, for
example, is seen in the way the Athenians philosophize like they build, with every position
supported by the pillar of reason. Most importantly, however, the absence of reasons forces the
reader to complete Nietzsche’s thought. The “incomplete presentation of an idea, of a whole
philosophy, is sometimes more effective than its exhaustive realization,” Nietzsche writes,
“[M]ore is left for the beholder to do, he is impelled to continue working on that which appears
before him so strongly etched in light and shadow, to think it through to the end, and to
overcome even that constraint which has hitherto prevented it from stepping forth fully formed”
(HH 178).
The value of Nietzsche’s writing is that it incites the will to resist. In its ambiguity, it elicits
many “no’s” that are followed by a search for one’s own “yes”. As the bricks of his philosophy,
26

Nietzsche first reads Schopenhauer in 1865. In 1869 and 1870, he publishes three studies on Diogenes Laertius
(Barnes 115).
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Nietzsche’s aphorisms do not always constitute arguments in the sense of conclusions resting on
premises, and so to determine his position on a topic, or his reasons for holding it, readers must
add their own thought. They must struggle against the text, increasing the significance of some
passages, while downplaying the importance of others, in order to make their interpretation agree
with the ideas Nietzsche does present. To interpret Nietzsche is to stargaze. One traces a
constellation in the aphorisms by pointing to a few, and leaving the rest in the dark.
When reading Nietzsche, one also contends with contradiction. Both within and between works,
Nietzsche’s views on a topic change. His thought is rough water and one can easily become sick
of it, sick from it. For instance, while in Beyond, Nietzsche writes of free spirits as potential
philosophers who will save humanity from nihilism (211), in the 1886 preface to Human, he
explains they are a fantasy he uses to save himself from loneliness. In addition to founders,
philosophers are those with the courage to question the unquestionable. “Philosophy, as I have so
far understood and lived it,” Nietzsche writes, “means living voluntarily among ice and high
mountains – seeking out everything strange and questionable in existence” (EH “Preface” 3).
This solitude, however, is not as voluntary as Nietzsche makes it seem. Ruled by an insatiable
will-to-knowledge, philosophers give voice to painful truths that no one wants to hear. The
consequence of Nietzsche’s all-too-human observations is an isolation he tries to recover from
by seeking the company of friends who are no longer there. “Thus,” he writes, “when I needed to
I once also invented for myself the ‘free spirits’” (HH “Preface” 2).
A more significant contradiction results when the reader tries to identify the central aim of
Nietzsche’s philosophy. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche presents the revaluation of values as “the
dominant task” (“Clever” 9) of his ruling drive, only to later call raising the will of humanity
“the greatest of all tasks” (“BT” 4). While the first aim is theoretical, involving the study of grey
documents, the second requires competition under blue sky. As Nietzsche himself demonstrates,
however, most contradiction is only apparent. Opposing terms are reconciled through the
discovery of a common origin, or the unveiling of a common goal. Pain and pleasure, for
instance, share an origin in resistance. While pain is the experience of resistance, pleasure is the
27

experience of its overcoming.
27

Conversely, the conflict between critique of morality and

To utilitarians who believe that happiness can be increased through a decrease in suffering, Nietzsche writes: “Oh,
how little do you know of the happiness of man, you comfortable and good–natured ones! For happiness and
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increase of will is dissolved through reference to a common goal. In order for the philosopher’s
vision of a future greatness to be realized, will must rise to the point of overflowing, which in
turn requires the introduction of values that lead to conflict. The result of Nietzsche’s
genealogical investigation into morality is not only the knowledge of what values to install in the
future aristocracy, but the crucial insight that they can be. Nietzsche shows that rather than
timeless truths, moralities are inventions with history.
When it is not merely apparent, the conflict within Nietzsche’s philosophy is the result of the
conflict within him. Slave and master moralities have been at war for two thousand years, and
“today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a ‘higher nature,’ a more spiritual nature, than
that of being divided in this sense and a genuine battleground of these opposed values” (GM I
16). As one adopts the values that maintain one’s particular amount of will, to be a composite of
master and salve moralities is to waver between a strong and weak will, that is to say, between
sickness and health. As a distressed professor, Nietzsche writes approvingly of Epicureanism,
while as a good European, he disparages Epicurean pleasure as a precursor to Christian salvation.
As a disciple of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche writes within a metaphysical framework, while as an
untimely thinker, he recognizes the desire to escape reality as a sign of decadence. Despite his
28

moments of health, however, Nietzsche mourns for lost consolations.

Once beyond convention,

free spirits realize that nets are not only what confine, they are also what catch.
The general consensus in Nietzsche studies is that by the end of his middle period, Nietzsche
writes from the perspective of a health that manifests itself in a “Dionysian” affirmation of life.
Frank Cameron, for example, writes that in book four of Science, Nietzsche outlines an
“affirmative ethics” (193) composed of the concepts “eternal return,” “becoming what one is,”
and “amor fati”. Rather than indications of Nietzsche’s victory over resentment, however, these

misfortune are two siblings and twins who either grow up together or – as with you – remain small together!” (GS
338).
28

The resilience of the metaphysical need “can be seen from the fact that even when the free spirit has divested
himself of everything metaphysical the highest effects of art can easily set the metaphysical strings, which have long
been silent or indeed snapped apart, vibrating in sympathy; so it can happen, for example, that a passage in
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony will make him feel he is hovering above the earth in a dome of stars with the dream
of immortality in his heart: all the stars seem to glitter around him and the earth seems to sink farther and farther
away” (HH 153).
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ideals express his ongoing struggle against it. When the appearance of Socrates is kept in mind,
section 276 reads as acceptance of one’s inability to be other than what one is: “I want to lean
more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them - thus I will be
one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from now on! I do not
want to wage war against ugliness”. The last line of Ecce Homo is not Dionysus “defeats” the
Crucified, but Dionysus “versus” the Crucified (“Destiny” 9). The war between master and slave
moralities continues. While one may never get beyond good and evil, or answer the question of
what Nietzsche means, in the struggle the will grows. This, perhaps, is the meaning of “[w]hat
does not kill me makes me stronger” (TI “Maxims” 8).
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